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INTERNATIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AS
STEWARDS: TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTION
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Iris H-Y Chiu*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the United Kingdom (U.K.) banking crisis 2008–2009,
institutional shareholders have been accused of having been “asleep.”1 The
critique is that institutional shareholders have been uncritical of risky
business practices in their investee banks and should have monitored board
risk management.2 Although institutional shareholder apathy is not regarded
as the key cause of the U.K. banking crisis, the Walker Review, Sir David
Walker’s report on corporate governance in banks and financial institutions,
is of the view that such institutional shareholder apathy has provided a
tolerant context for misjudgments of risk made at the Board level of the
failed U.K. banks.3 A number of corporate governance reforms have since
been made in the U.K., including reforms to Board composition and Boardlevel practices.4 The focus of this Article is the “Stewardship Code,”5 a set
of best practices for institutional shareholders, encouraging them to move
away from apathy and to engage with investee companies.
The notion of “stewardship,” in relation to institutional shareholders,
may be “defined as the process through which [institutional] shareholders,
directors and others seek to influence companies in the direction of longterm, sustainable performance that derives from contributing to human
progress and the wellbeing of the environment and society.”6 The key
*

Senior Lecturer, University College London, Centre for European Law and Governance,
Centre for Ethics and the Law. The author thanks Professors Rebecca Parry, Dan Prentice, Roman
Tomasic, Eilis Ferran, and Brian Cheffins for their helpful comments on earlier versions. The
ideas in this Article have also been presented at the Society of Legal Scholars Conference 2011.
All errors and omissions are mine.
1. Jennifer Hughes, FSA Chief Lambasts Uncritical Investors, FIN. TIMES, March 11, 2009,
at 1; Kate Burgess, Myners Lashes Out at Landlord Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c0217c20-2eaf-11de-b7d3-00144feabdc0.html; see also Helia
Ebrahimi, Institutional shareholders Admit Oversight Failure on Banks, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 27, 2009, at 1.
2. DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKS AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS ¶¶ 5.10–.11 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter WALKER
REVIEW], available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf.
3. Id. ¶ 5.10.
4. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 2–3 (June
2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/ukcgcode.cfm.
5. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (July 2010) [hereinafter UK
STEWARDSHIP CODE], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm.
6. Arad Reisberg, The Notion of Stewardship from a Company Law Perspective: Re-Defined
and Re-Assessed in Light of the Recent Financial Crisis?, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 126, 126 (2011)
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notions in “stewardship” seem to be long-termism, and taking a more
holistic view of the well-being and performance of the company. This
Article will argue that “stewardship” embodies an ideological shift in
corporate governance theory away from the dominant shareholder-centered
contractarian paradigm. Hence, the role that is expected of shareholder
stewardship is a form of governance that also serves the interests of
stakeholders and the public, and not merely a call to rejuvenate shareholder
power.
Part I argues that the dominant theoretical framework for corporate
governance in the U.K. is very much a shareholder-centered contractarian
paradigm. Although the contractarian theory has been most developed in
U.S. corporate governance theory, company law in the U.K. and the reforms
leading up to the Companies Act 2006 (the Companies Act) show that
policy-makers endorse the dominant contractarian paradigm and the key
position of shareholders in corporate governance.
Part II then discusses the U.K. Stewardship Code, a body of soft law for
the governance role of institutional shareholders. The contextual
background to the Stewardship Code is also important as “stewardship” is
articulated as a complementary force for governance in the financial
regulation landscape post-global-financial-crisis. This Part will argue that
“stewardship” is a notion that enrolls institutional shareholders into a
governance role beyond that of corporate governance. This, however,
entails an ideological paradox. On the one hand, the Stewardship Code
seems to emphasize the importance of institutional shareholders’ corporate
governance role, very much in line with the shareholder-centered
contractarian paradigm dominant in corporate governance theory. This
Article, however, argues that the principles in the Stewardship Code could
bring about a gradual move away from shareholder-centered
contractarianism. This Part will argue that the key features of “stewardship”
limit shareholders’ contractarian freedom in monitoring, particularly in
short-termist tendencies. Further, when examined against the backdrop of
the “enlightened shareholder value” rhetoric supporting the reforms leading
up to the Companies Act, it will be argued that “stewardship” has the
potential to introduce an ideological shift that moves away from the tenets
of shareholder-centered contractarianism.
Yet, the Stewardship Code is still nested within the broader context of
the importance of equity finance and securities markets in the U.K. Part III
suggests that although “stewardship” has the potential to introduce an
ideological shift in corporate governance theory, such a shift is not in the
(citing MARK GOYDER & ARTHUR PROBERT, TOMORROW’S COMPANY, TOMORROW’S
OWNERS—DEFINING, DIFFERENTIATING AND REWARDING STEWARDSHIP 3 (Pat Cleverly ed.,
2009), available at http://www.forceforgood.com/Uploaded_Content/tool/2311200915392335
.pdf.
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direction of “communitarianizing” corporate governance theory. This Part
examines the main strands of “communitarian” theories and argues that the
“stewardship” notion does not go that far. Nevertheless, this Article
critically analyzes the principles in the Stewardship Code and argues that
elements of stakeholder theory may be discerned. This Part argues that
“stewardship” elevates the importance of “key stakeholders” and
contextualizes the objective of shareholding so that the nature of
shareholder-centered contractarianism could be significantly affected.
It may nevertheless be argued that the form of stakeholder theory that is
supported by the Stewardship Code is a somewhat weak and confused
version of stakeholder theory that attempts an uneasy marriage with the
dominant shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm. Part IV fleshes out
the theoretical weaknesses of the Stewardship Code. Nonetheless, this
Article argues that the Stewardship Code represents a first step toward
modifying the shareholder-centered contractarian nature of the corporation.
In particular, for financial institutions, the Stewardship Code embodies an
elevation of the state or relevant regulator into a key stakeholder position.7
The notion of “key stakeholders” has evolutionary potential in corporate
governance theory and it is hoped that such ideological possibilities can be
further developed in corporate governance theory.
I.

SHAREHOLDER-CENTERD CONTRACTARIANISM AS
DOMINANT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORY

Much of the theoretical literature in corporate law may be placed
broadly in two camps of thought. The first is that the company is a nexus of
contracts, and hence, the nature of corporate law deals with transactional,
relational, and private order issues. The second views the corporation as a
“real entity” whose activities and exercise of power may entail social
impact and externalities, and so, posits that corporate law should relate to
the entity nature of the corporation and its acts. As Worthington argues,
both strands of thought are evident in the development of corporate law in
the U.K.,8 although the contractarian model supporting the agency paradigm
that characterizes the Board-shareholder relationship is arguably the
7. This is not an entirely new idea. An earlier piece by Kern Alexander points out that the
state has an interest in regulating corporate governance aspects of financial institutions where this
has bearing on the micro-prudential soundness of financial institutions, such as the fitness and
soundness of senior management. See Kern Alexander, UK Corporate Governance and Banking
Regulation: The Regulator’s Role as Stakeholder, 33 STETSON L. REV. 991, 1033–34 (2004). This
Article takes this idea further and argues that while the state’s “stake” after the global financial
crisis may need to become more open-ended, this may be difficult to accommodate within existing
corporate governance ideology. The Article will thus evaluate what the Stewardship Code has
achieved from the ideological point of view.
8. Sarah Worthington, Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement, 22
COMPANY LAW. 258, 307, at 263–66, 308–10 (2001) (pts. 1 & 2).
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dominant theoretical paradigm for corporate theory and law.9 The
contractarian model of corporate governance and law, and the finance
perspective that characterizes the Board-shareholder relationship as one of
agency, allow institutional shareholders to be placed in the key role of
monitoring management. Such is the optimal hypothetical bargain that
shareholders would have made.
A. THE DOMINANCE OF THE CONTRACTARIAN PARADIGM IN
CORPORATE THEORY AND LAW
In 1937, Coase’s seminal work The Nature of the Firm10 provided the
foundation upon which the contractarian conception of the corporation
became a dominant intellectual paradigm.11 The firm as a nexus of
transactions that are off market because of transaction cost efficiency has
become a powerful and lasting conception of the corporation.
The contractarian approach focuses on the microscopic constituents of
the firm as a nexus of contracts entered into by volition; hence, the role of
corporate law, boosted by the rise of the law and economics movement,
deals with making such contractual relations efficacious. Staunch
contractual theorists in corporate law support the role of corporate law as an
enabling or facilitative framework so that contracting parties may decide
how their relations may be governed.12 The pure contractual framework is
oblivious to the effects of the corporate entity as a whole. Bebchuk has
nevertheless pointed out that it is a myth that constituents in a corporation
actively engage in contractual bilateralism to determine the substantive
governance of their relations.13

9. John Armour & Michael Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 32
O.J.L.S. 429, 429 (2007) (Eng.). See generally BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY,
STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (1997) (providing contractarian analyses of the company; pages 31–
46 examines the contractarian theory itself).
10. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
11. Steven M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 547 (2003).
12. See, e.g., William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982) (suggesting that the firm may be understood as a series of
bargains, negotiated under constraints, and made in view of a long-term relationship); Fred
McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of Eisenberg, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1332 (1990) (arguing that Eisenberg’s view that a corporation is essentially a nexus of
rules, rather than contracts, is foolish because such rules are quintessentially contractual rules);
Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540 (1995)
(positing that the manager-shareholder relationship may best be conceptualized as a game-theory
based bargain).
13. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1827–29 (1989);
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395, 1400–01 (1989).
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Easterbrook and Fischel’s influential thesis is that the role of corporate
law is to provide a default set of rules that represents a hypothetical bargain
between institutional shareholders and management.14 This overcomes the
problem of the myth of active contracting, but nevertheless upholds the
enabling character of corporate law to support the conception of the
corporation as a nexus of contracts. These hypothetical bargains would
reasonably reflect contracting parties’ expectations as well as minimize
transaction costs amongst them.15 The “defaultization” thesis goes as far as
to support shareholder rights such as voting and the imposition of fiduciary
duties on directors in order to protect the open-ended residual risks that
institutional shareholders bear.16
The contractarian model has evolved to focus on the Board-shareholder
relationship following the financial economics perspective that
characterizes the main corporate governance “problem” as the agency
problem. The Board-shareholder relationship is defined as an agency
relationship, where institutional shareholders bear agency costs as part of
the risk of delegating to management the primary role of generating and
using corporate wealth.17 Such delegation is open-ended, and shareholders
bear the residual risks that management would be serving their own
interests instead of maximizing shareholder wealth.18 The agency paradigm
is a dominant ideological paradigm influencing the legal characterization of
shareholders’ roles and powers and directors’ fiduciary duties. Mandatory
law in the U.K. treats shareholders as the monitors of the Board, and
provides for certain decisions to be reserved for the general meeting.
Provisions dealing with the appointment and removal of directors are
examples of the former.19 Further, directors or their connected persons are
not allowed to enter into substantial property transactions with the
company,20 or to benefit from a company loan or quasi-loan21 or other credit
14. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, in The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 1, 34 (1991).
15. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1819–21 (1991).
16. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, The Fiduciary Principle, the
Business Judgment Rule, and the Derivative Suit, in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 14, at 90, 90–91.
17. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN & WILLIAM H. MECKLING, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
STRATEGY 51, 53–54, 95–96 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 1998).
18. See id. at 54.
19. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 160, 168–169, 188 (U.K.) (in respect of long-service
contracts exceeding two years with the company). Appointments may, however, be made just by
the Board under the Model Articles, although this may be modified by companies. The Companies
(Model Articles) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, sched. 1, § 17, sched. 2, § 17, sched. 3, § 20
(U.K.).
20. Companies Act §§ 190–196 (U.K.).
21. Id. §§ 197–200, 213–214.
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transaction,22 without the approval of shareholders by an ordinary
resolution. These provisions co-opt shareholders into monitoring the
prospects of self-dealing by management, and in turn allow the exercise of a
form of proprietary control for shareholders. Further, directors acting in
conflicts of interest and duty may seek shareholder approval for the
transactions. Shareholder approval thus takes on a gate-keeping function to
ensure that directors are allowed to proceed without running the risk of a
breach of fiduciary duties.23 Mandatory law has also provided for
shareholders to have the right of ratification or otherwise of breaches,
negligence, or omissions committed by directors.24 The right of shareholder
ratification seems particularly based on the perspective of shareholders as
residual risk bearers and hence the exclusive right to act as assessors of
whether or not it is appropriate to accept irregularities committed by
management.
Although the contractarian theory has been most ideologically
developed in the writings of American commentators, it has perhaps found
easy acceptance in English corporate law, which has been evolved from
partnership law. English corporate law arguably has a natural emphasis and
concern for the private order and internal relationships that subsist beneath
the corporate structure. Hence, English corporate law is largely dominated
by the intellectual framework of the contractarian theory which entails two
consequences for corporate governance: one, that corporate governance is
essentially a framework for private order; and two, that mandatory
regulation in this area should be limited unless market failures persist.
Much of corporate governance in the U.K., in terms of Board
composition and shareholder engagement, is therefore seen as an exercise
of best practice in order to motivate institutional shareholders to protect
their relatively weaker position as principals and residual risk-bearers in the
open-ended contract into which they have entered. The U.K. Corporate
Governance Code enshrines a set of best practices for companies to comply
with or explain, so as to allow institutional shareholders to intelligently
monitor and consider the effects of corporate governance upon their
interests.25 This approach is a shareholder-centered contractarian
perspective of the corporation, viewing institutional shareholders as
ultimate monitors of Board practices and accountability. The development
22. Id. §§ 201–214.
23. Id. §§ 175(4), 180.
24. Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 203–04 (Ch.) (now enshrined with
modification in Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 239).
25. Moore further argues that the Stewardship Code should contain macro principles for
greater flexibility in application so that individual companies can explain their considered
governance models even if deviating from the Stewardship Code as such. See Marc T. Moore,
Whispering Sweet Nothings: The Limitations of Informal Conformance in UK Corporate
Governance, J. CORP. L. STUD. 95, 104 (2009).
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of corporate governance codes in the U.K. since 199226 is intended to
facilitate contractarian discipline within the internal working of the
corporation, even if empirical research by MacNeil and Li, and by FaureGrimaud, show that institutional shareholders are largely agnostic about the
governance profile of an investee company, unless the company has underperformed.27 The capstone of the first 1992 Cadbury Code of Corporate
Governance is arguably shareholder monitoring. The Cadbury committee
views institutional shareholders as follows:
[Institutional s]hareholders have delegated many of their responsibilities
as owners to the directors who act as their stewards. It is for the
[institutional] shareholders to call the directors to book if they appear to be
failing in their stewardship and they should use this power. While they
cannot be involved in the direction and management of their company,
they can insist on a high standard of corporate governance and good
governance is an essential test of the directors’ stewardship.28

Institutional shareholders are also especially admonished:
[T]he way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence
the standards of corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Their
readiness to do this turns on the degree to which they see it as their
responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those whose money they are
investing, to bring about changes in companies when necessary, rather
than selling their shares.29

We look to the institutions in particular, with the backing of the
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, to use their influence as owners to
ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with the
Code. The widespread adoption of our recommendations will turn in large
measure on the support which all institutional shareholders give to them.
“The obligation on companies to state how far they comply with the Code
provides institutional and individual shareholders with a ready-made

26. Corporate governance codes in the U.K. have developed thusly: from the Cadbury Code of
1992, to revisions in 1995 made after the Greenbury Committee’s report on executive
remuneration; then in 1998 after review by the Hampel Committee, and again in 2003 following
the Higgs review of the role of non-executive directors; and then in 2006 and 2008, before the
Walker Review findings culminated in the revised and re-named UK Corporate Governance Code
of 2010.
27. Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the
UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 193 (2010);
Ian MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the
Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 486, 492, 494 (2006).
28. COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 6.6 (1992) [hereinafter CADBURY
REPORT], available at http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cadbury/report/index.html.
29. Id. ¶ 6.10.
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agenda for their representations to boards. It is up to them to put it to good
use.”30
The soft law on corporate governance in the U.K. has developed in
order to boost institutional shareholder monitoring as a form of private
order beneath the corporate structure. Such monitoring is couched in terms
of institutional shareholders’ own private investment interests and is not
framed with reference to any other external welfare objectives.
II. THE U.K. STEWARDSHIP CODE
In the wake of the U.K. banking crisis 2008–2009, institutional
shareholders have been accused of having been “asleep.”31 The critique is
that institutional shareholders have been uncritical of risky business
practices in their investee banks and should have monitored Board risk
management.32 Although the European Commission Green Paper
acknowledges that the lack of critical scrutiny by institutional shareholders
in financial institutions may be a “special case” due to the complexity of
banking businesses, the Paper nevertheless points out that shareholder
apathy is a chronic problem in listed companies with dispersed ownership.33
If the quality of monitoring by institutional shareholders is, nevertheless,
consistent with their private investment objectives, why then are
institutional shareholders criticized? Such criticism may arguably be
unwarranted as institutional shareholders should have contractarian
freedom, within the contractarian paradigm of corporate governance, to
determine how and for what purpose their monitoring is carried out. The
critique against the perceived laxity of institutional shareholders is based on
a different expectation of the purpose of corporate governance. The Walker
Review and the Stewardship Code pay tribute to this other expectation; and
on this basis, this Article argues that there is potential for the introduction
of a theoretical shift from the shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm.
The position taken by the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code is
nevertheless not entirely groundbreaking. This Article attempts to map out a
possible theoretical trajectory going forward in order not to lose the
momentum of reform.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. ¶ 6.16 (emphasis added).
Hughes, supra note 1; Burgess, supra note 1; see also Ebrahimi, supra note 1.
WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5.10–.11
Commission Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, ¶ 2, COM (2011)
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Commission Green Paper], available at http://ec.europa.eu
/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2011-164_en.pdf.

2012]

International Shareholders as Stewards

395

A. THE WALKER REVIEW AND BEYOND
The Walker Review of corporate governance in U.K. banks and other
financial industry entities,34 in the wake of the global financial crisis,
provides the key context for the Stewardship Code. The Review examines
the extent to which corporate governance could have contributed to the
failure of certain banks in the U.K. and provides many recommendations to
strengthen Boards, risk management, and the role of institutional
shareholder monitoring.35 The Report opines that shareholder engagement is
important in the public interest, videlicet:
The potentially highly influential position of significant holders of stock in
listed companies is a major ingredient in the market-based capitalist
system which needs to earn and to be accorded an at least implicit social
legitimacy. As counterpart to the obligation of the board to the
[institutional] shareholders, this implicit legitimacy can be acquired by at
least the larger fund manager through assumption of a reciprocal
obligation involving attentiveness to the performance of investee
companies over a long as well as a short-term horizon. On this view, those
who have significant rights of ownership and enjoy the very material
advantage of limited liability should see these as complemented by a duty
of stewardship. This is a view that would be shared by the public, as well
as those employees and suppliers who are less well-placed than an
institutional shareholder to diversify their exposure to the management
36
and performance risk of a limited liability company.

The references to “social legitimacy” in a market-based capitalist
system, and to the “stewardship” of equity providers, show an interesting
contrast with the quotations above in the Cadbury Report. These references
refer to both private and public interest notions in institutional shareholders’
investment role; that is, because investment, particularly by institutions, is
backed by social legitimacy, the investment role carries with it stewardship
responsibilities.
The contextual reference to the Walker Review, which precedes the
Stewardship Code, should be taken together with the Principles in the Code
in order to discern if a theoretical shift in corporate governance theory has
been encouraged. I argue that, considering stakeholder and social
responsibility issues, the key features of the Code on long-termism and
holistic notions of stewardship encourage a move away from the
shareholder-centered contractarian model in corporate governance theory.
On the other hand, one could argue that the Stewardship Code does nothing
groundbreaking in terms of corporate governance theoryt affirms the
34. Walker Review, supra note 2.
35. Id. ¶ 5.9.
36. Id. ¶ 5.7 (emphasis added).
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monitoring position of institutional shareholders, but more explicitly sets
out how monitoring may be made optimal. In this respect, it merely fleshes
out more of the facilitative framework to assist in private contractarian
monitoring. The following will examine the nature of monitoring, as
envisaged in the Stewardship Code, in order to see if the Code still endorses
a shareholder-centered contractarian view of institutional shareholders’
corporate governance role.
The Walker Review of Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial
Institutions in the U.K. advocates that the future of institutional shareholder
activism should be an exercise in stewardship. The Review states:
Experience in the recent crisis phase has forcefully illustrated that while
[institutional] shareholders enjoy limited liability in respect of their
investee companies, in the case of major banks the taxpayer has been
obliged to assume effectively unlimited liability. This further underlines
the importance of discharge of the responsibility of [institutional]
shareholders as owners, which has been inadequately acknowledged in the
past.37

The enactment of the Stewardship Code is not confined to investing in
financial institutions that may be supported by the lender of the last resort
and government bailout. The Stewardship Code extends generally to
institutional shareholders investing in the corporate sector. The general
application of the Stewardship Code would require that institutional
shareholders regard “stewardship” as a tenet of investment, and should
require the notion of “stewardship” to characterize the responsibilities
accompanying investment generally. But what does “stewardship” mean?
Institutional investors are already subject to legal obligations of trusteeship
that are imposed on them in the capacity of managing pension funds and
insurance savings. Thus, what would “stewardship” encompass that is not
already captured in the legal relationship of trusteeship between
institutional funds and their beneficiaries?
It is arguable that the characterization of “stewardship” is not merely a
reiteration of the status quo, being that investment managers owe duties to
funds, and that funds owe trusteeship duties to beneficiaries.38
“Stewardship” seems to include notions of public interest and
accountabilitythat institutional investors should monitor the corporate
sector not only in the interests of the long-term savers who invest in those
institutional funds, but also for the long-term well-being of the economy as
a whole. This is similar to the “universal ownership” model that Hawley
and Williams advocate: institutional monitoring should act as a “bridge
37. Id. at 12.
38. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Stewardship as Investment Management for Institutional
Shareholders, 32 COMPANY LAW. 65, 65–67 (2011) (setting forth the argument).
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between public policy, corporate governance and the well-being of
[beneficiaries].”39 This characterization of institutional shareholder
monitoring would go beyond the notion of shareholder monitoring as an
outworking of the agency problem40 in the private order of the corporation.
Such monitoring is also intended to be a form of governance that takes into
account the wider public interest and social good.
The Stewardship Code requires that, as a matter of stewardship,
“[i]nstitutional [shareholders] should monitor their investee companies.”41
Such “monitoring” includes seeking to be satisfied that corporate
governance arrangements are robust, carrying out meetings with company
directors and/or the Chairman of the Board, maintaining records of such
meetings, considering the use of voting power, and attending general
meetings.42 “Monitoring” also includes the “escalation” of shareholder
engagement where it is appropriate to do so in order to protect and enhance
shareholder value, and may include intensifying meetings with Board
members, making public statements, and even requisitioning general
meetings.43 The “monitoring” is couched in terms of protecting, and under
Principle 4, “enhancing” shareholder value.44 In this way, it may be argued
that the “monitoring” in the Stewardship Code is an outworking of private
interestthat institutional shareholders monitor Boards in their private
investment interests. If so, the Stewardship Code may be regarded as a
standardized bargain between shareholders and the corporation in order to
protect shareholders’ interests as capital suppliers with a residual claimant
status. The Stewardship Code seems not to have broken any new
ideological ground.
Nevertheless, there are a few features of the Stewardship Code that
seem to indicate a move away from treating shareholder monitoring as an
essentially private matter; for example, the reference to “long-term
[performance]” of companies in the Preface to the Code—it is curious,
however, that this is not further embodied in the Principles.45
39. James P. Hawley & Andrew T. Williams, The Universal Owner’s Role in Sustainable
Economic Development, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 217, 223 (Rory Sullivan & Craig
MacKenzie eds., 2006) (quoting Mark Mansley & Andrew Dlugolecki, Climate Change: A Risk
Management Challenge for Institutional Investors 12 (Universities Superannuation Scheme, Ltd.
2001),
available
at
http://www.uss.co.uk/Documents/USS%20Climate%20Change%20%20A%20RIsk%20Management%20Challenge%20for%20Inst%20Investors%20SUMMARY%2
02001.pdf).
40. See generally JENSEN & MECKLING, supra note 17 (discussing the role of monitoring in
the agency problem).
41. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 3 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. princ. 4.
44. Id.
45. See generally UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5. Note that the only place where the
Stewardship Code mentions the “long-term” is in the preface.
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It is not clear if “long-term performance” is couched in financial terms
or extends more holistically to the well-being of the company in its
contribution to human and economic progress. It is arguable that the
Stewardship Code’s preference for the “long-term horizon” of institutional
shareholders is consistent with the “enlightened shareholder value” rhetoric
championed by policy-makers in the reforms leading up to the Companies
Act.
The “enlightened shareholder value” model underlies section 172 of the
Companies Act dealing with directors’ fiduciary duties to promote the longterm success of the company, taking into account matters relating to the
interests of stakeholders such as employees and the community, and to
responsibility for the environment.46 Although the “enlightened shareholder
value” model pertains to defining the scope of directors’ duties,47 it also
paints a picture of what shareholders’ interests should be. The “enlightened
shareholder” is the benchmark of a hypothetical shareholder who is
interested in the long-term well-being and performance of the company, and
its social and environmental impact. The “enlightened shareholder value”
model arguably provides a normative framework for shareholder behavior,
and an investment approach toward long-term performance, with such longterm performance being a holistic rather than a narrowly financial measure.
On the whole, the Stewardship Code seems to encourage “patient capital”48
as key to stewardship.
Principle 4 of the Stewardship Code envisages the possibility of
escalated monitoring in view of “risks arising from social and
environmental matters.”49 This is arguably consistent with the “enlightened
shareholder value” model mentioned above. Principle 4 may be setting out
a normative principle that institutional shareholders should be concerned
about corporate social responsibility matters, thereby requiring institutional
shareholders to move away from narrowly focusing on financial

46. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.).
47. See Andrew Keay, Enlightened Shareholder Value, The Reform of the Duties of Company
Directors and the Corporate Objective, 2006 L.M.C.L.Q. 335, 360–61 (Eng.). See generally
Andrew Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism? Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder
Value, and More: Much Ado About Little?, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Keay,
Moving Towards Stakeholderism] (analyzing section 172 of the 2006 Companies Act).
48. Term used for “long-term capital” during the proceedings of a symposium hosted by the
CFA Centre for Financial Integrity Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics. See
generally CFA Centre for Fin. Integrity/Bus. Roundtable Inst. for Corporate Ethics, Symposium
Report, Breaking the Short-Term Cycle: Discussion and Recommendations on How Corporate
Leaders, Asset Managers, Investors and Analysts Can Refocus on Long-term Value (2006)
[hereinafter Breaking the Short-Term Cycle] (summarizing symposium proceedings), available at
http://www.darden.virginia.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/Short-termism_Report.pdf.
49. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 4.
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performance and to take a more holistic view of corporate performance
including its impact on wider society.50
It could be argued that institutional shareholders’ concern for social
responsibility and environmental matters could be completely within the
realm of their private investment interest, as a corporation’s energy savings
or avoidance of environmental or tortious liability could affect financial
performance. In this way, Principle 4 does not require institutional
shareholders to balance their private investment interests against social or
environmental impact. It could be argued that Principle 4 may be seeking a
convergence of institutional shareholders’ private interests with the public
interest of communitarian concerns, so that beneficial social or
environmental outcomes could by the way be attained.51 This would not
amount to a call to social activism. Although an undertone of public interest
can be detected in the reference to social and environmental matters in
Principle 4, Principle 4 does not advocate the more radical embrace of
social activism.
Academic literature has shown that there is still an indeterminate link
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance;52 hence,
there may arguably be no natural convergence between institutional
shareholders’ private investment interests and corporate social
responsibility. If so, could Principle 4 then be regarded as providing a
normative benchmark for shareholder behavior toward a form of social
activism? The enlightened shareholder value rhetoric provides some
encouragement toward a normative model of shareholder behavior, so that
institutional shareholders engage not only for their “own good,” but also in
considering the “good of others.” Although Principle 4 is not overtly
50. See Simon Deakin, Squaring the Circle? Shareholder Value and Corporate Social
Responsibility in the U.K., 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 976, 978, 980, 986 (2002).
51. See, e.g., Steve Waygood, Measuring the Effectiveness of Investor Engagement: GSK and
Developing Country Access to Essential Medicines, in RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 39,
at 206, 212.
52. Michael L. Barnett & Robert M. Salomon, Beyond Dichotomy: The Curvilinear
Relationship Between Social Responsibility and Financial Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
1101, 1105–06 (2006). Some studies generally supporting a positive correlation are as follows:
Marc Orlitzky, Links between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial
Performance: Theoretical and Empirical Determinants, in 2 CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 41 (José Allouche ed., 2006); Laura Poddi & Sergio Vergalli, Does Corporate
Social Responsibility Affect the Performance of Firms? (FEEM, Working Paper No. 52.2009,
2009), available at http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2009/NDL2009-052.pdf;
Jeffrey P. Katz, Eric Higgins, Marsha Dickson & Molly Eckman, The Impact of External
Monitoring and Public Reporting on Business Performance in a Global Manufacturing Industry,
48 BUS. & SOC’Y 489 (2009). Other studies finding a negative correlation are as follows: Stephen
Brammer, Chris Brooks & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Social Performance and Stock Returns:
UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures, 35 FIN. MGMT. 97 (2006); Leonardo Bechetti &
Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market Performance (CEIS: Ctr. for
Econ. & Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 79, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract
=897499.
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endorsing social activism, it is still important to note the encouragement
toward a holistic consideration of corporate well-being. Perhaps, short of
social activism, Principle 4 could be normativizing a form of institutional
shareholder governance that avoids negative externalities.
Principle 5 envisages that institutions may step up engagement in
collective terms especially “at times of significant corporate or wider
economic stress, or when the risks posed threaten the ability of the company
to continue.”53 Collective institutional shareholder engagement may take on
a representative type of market governance for wider social concerns,
beyond the atomistic concerns of investment purposes. The reference to
“wider economic stress” likely refers to concern for the public interest.54
Principle 5 thus seems to have the effect of framing shareholder
engagement within normative expectations that are consistent with public
interest objectives.
Principle 5, in this Article’s view, indicates that institutional
shareholders are being overtly regarded as part of the governance landscape
in furtherance of public interest. Regulation theory, in the wake of the
decline of the state55 and central command-and-control type mechanisms in
regulatory control, has been advocating theoretical models of de-centralized
governance56 where various actors, public or private, may act in a
“regulatory space”57 to exert governance and discipline on each other.
Although different theories present different levels of optimism as to how
the private interests of various actors may coincidentally produce beneficial
public interest effects, and how the patchwork of governance forces may
53. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 5.
54. Part I of the WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, discusses stewardship as a part of the social
legitimacy of shareholding.
55. For views on the decline of the nation state, see generally PREM SHANKAR JHA, THE
TWILIGHT OF THE NATION STATE: GLOBALISATION AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES ON THE
NATION STATE (Anne Marie Smith & Kate Nash eds., 2006); GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
56. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004). See generally Julia Black,
Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Black,
Critical Reflections on Regulation] (exploring the requirements for, and implications of,
“decentralized” regulation); Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from
UK Financial Services Regulation, 2003 PUB. L. 63 (U.K.) [hereinafter Black, Enrolling Actors in
Regulatory Systems] (analyzing the role of regulatory capacity and regulatory enrollment in decentered and fragmented regulation); Julia Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary
Financial Services Regulation, 2 J. CORP. L. STUD. 253 (2002) [hereinafter Black, Mapping the
Contours] (arguing that financial services regulation is fragmented and examining such regulation
through a de-centered analysis of regulation); Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing,
Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV.
1 (2008) (providing an overview and analysis of governance theory and reform).
57. See Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional
Design, 2001 PUB. L. 329, 331 (U.K.). See generally id. at 330–34 (describing the “regulatory
space” metaphor).

2012]

International Shareholders as Stewards

401

work together,58 the direction that is clear is that we are increasingly
looking for governance potential in a range of different actors, private or
public. Hence, Principle 5 can be seen in this light: institutional
shareholders, being proximate to their investee corporations, and given
certain proprietary rights of control through voting and management
accountability, are in a good position to be enrolled in the governance
landscape.
On the whole, the Stewardship Code admonishes institutional
shareholders to take on a more explicit governance role, thereby aligning
private and public interests and going beyond mere private interest. It may
be argued that the Financial Reporting Council applies on a comply-orexplain basis, and the Council has explicitly stated that some asset
managers may legitimately choose not to engage if that is not consistent
with their investment strategies, as long as an explanation is provided for
that purpose.59 This Article, however, argues that as the Stewardship Code’s
default position is that of stewardship and engagement, and is likely
targeted at large and significant pension funds and asset managers, the
exceptions to the Stewardship Code do not undermine the expectations in
the Stewardship Code with respect to changing shareholders’ governance
role. Further, this Article argues that there are two key features in the
Stewardship Code that fundamentally challenge the shareholder-centered
contractarian paradigm of corporate governance as they are inconsistent
with the contractarian freedom that should be enjoyed by institutional
shareholders in their corporate governance role. These two features are: the
call to monitor for the long-term, and the consideration of wider good in the
exercise of monitoring.
1. Long-Termism
Many commentators argue that, left to their own tendencies,
institutional shareholders are largely short-termist in nature. Dallas, arguing
58. Compare John S.F. Wright & Brian Head, Reconsidering Regulation and Governance
Theory: A Learning Approach, 31 L. & POL’Y 192, 211 (2009) (finding that the “Responsive
Regulation” theory, which “provides a normative frame based on public-interest considerations[,]”
may be applied most effectively where “industry interests are very strong and third-party voices
are relatively weak”), with Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Unraveling the Central State, but
How? Types of Multi-Level Governance, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 233, 238 (2003) (concluding that
“Type II governance,” where “a wide range of public and private actors who collaborate and
compete in shifting coalitions,” is task-driven and “designed to address a limited set of related
problems”). See also, Shann Turnbull, Self-Regulation, Address at the Ninth International
Conference on Socio-Economics, University of Montreal, at 2, 4–5 (July 6, 1997) (arguing that
self-regulation cannot work unless power is divided rather than absolute, power is shared by
interested parties, and multiple independent and varied inputs of information are supplied to such
parties), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=630041.
59. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STEWARDSHIP CODE ¶ 27 (July
2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/investorgovernance.cfm.
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that human behavior, technological advances, and the market structures and
legal frameworks are key to supporting a culture where capital constantly
accesses opportunities and thus defines performance in shorter and shorter
runs, presents a powerful account of how short-termism came to rule both
financial markets and the non-financial business sectors.60 This focus on
short-termism also causes non-financial business sectors to assess
performance in shorter and shorter runs, further feeding back into capital
needs.61 Short-termism, in other words, has naturally evolved in the
financial and non-financial business sectors, and is a combination of both
human behavior in managing risk and structural possibilities provided by
technology and law. The behavior of institutional shareholders in markets
such as the United States and U.K., dominated by equity capitalism, is also
heavily characterized by short-termism.62
Wong notes, from the practitioner’s point of view, that institutions such
as pension funds and insurance companies diversify their portfolios by
engaging different groups of asset managers to manage investments, and
further, that investment managers are assessed quarterly and regular
tournaments of asset managers are the norm.63 Such assessments are
generally made with reference to financial performance. A couple of
industry reports and surveys also confirm the overwhelming dominance of
short-termism in institutions’ approaches to investing, and the frequent
trading and exit behavior on the part of investment managers.64 Investment
managers, hence, prefer to be able to see their performance measured in
hard targets, which are financial in nature, and, therefore, tend to sell rather
than monitor a company for indefinite gains and periods.65
60. See Lynne Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 293–322 (2011) (discussing the causes of short-termism in financial and nonfinancial business sectors).
61. Id. at 310–16, 320–22 (discussing the spiraling problem of “myopia” in non-financial
business sectors).
62. See ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 1–2 (2009) (describing the prevalence
of short-termism in the United States), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications
/overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approach-investment-business-management.
Academic research has consistently argued that short-termism persists in the investment
management patterns in the U.K. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson, Towards a Mutual Understanding of
Objectives? Attitudes of Institutional Investors and Listed Companies to Corporate Governance
Reforms, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 196, 198, 203 (2001); John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard
Barker & John Roberts, Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and New Shareholder
Activism, 11 COMPETITION & CHANGE 223, 237 (2007).
63. Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship is Proving Elusive for Institutional Shareholders, 25
BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 406, 407 (2010). Academics have noted the same.
Paul Cox, Stephen Brammer & Andrew Millington, Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and
Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1307, 1311 (2007).
64. Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, supra note 48, at 1; ASPEN INST., supra note 62, at 1–2.
65. Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, supra note 48, at 3; ASPEN INST., supra note 62, at 2; cf.
Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic Investment Behavior, 73
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Institutional shareholders’ “natural” corporate governance behavior is
driven by their own investment needs, and short-termist trading and selling
out are key features of such behavior.66 Does this mean that the
“monitoring” envisaged under the shareholder-centered contractarian model
of corporate governance is a myth? It could be argued that “monitoring”
could also refer to such short-termist investment monitoring and selling out,
particularly if the market for corporate control could exert a form of
discipline on managers. Yet, Gaspar et al.’s research shows that shorttermist selling out to takeover bidders is motivated exclusively by
institutions’ investment perspectives and there is little consideration for the
investee company as such.67 Investee companies which have been bought
out by short-termist institutions have tended to fare less well in the longterm.68 Nevertheless, contractarian freedom is, by its nature, self-centered
and not other-centered; hence, short-termist monitoring is still consistent
with the private contractarian nature of institutional shareholders’ corporate
governance role.
The focus on long-termism, developed under the “enlightened
shareholder approach” in the U.K. company law reforms in 2006, and now
explicitly admonished in the Stewardship Code, is arguably contrary to the
natural tendencies and practices in the investment industry. The kind of
“monitoring” that would naturally evolve in a shareholder-centered
contractarian model of corporate governance would be short-termist in
nature: focused on financial performance and looking for opportunities to
exit. The contractarian model would arguably foster and support these
tendencies as a natural outworking of efficient contractual behavior. Hence,
compelling institutions to favor “patient capital” introduces a constraint
which does not arguably align with institutional shareholders’ natural
tendencies.69

ACCOUNTING. REV. 305, 306, 330 (1998) (finding that while institutional ownership can play a
monitoring role to ensure that managers choose to maximize long-run value over short-term
earnings targets, where such institutions exhibit “transient ownership characteristics,” the
probability that such managers will make the inverse choice is significantly increased); Brian
Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings Over Long-Run Values?, 18
CONTEMP. ACCOUNTING. RES. 207, 212–13, 240 (2004) (finding that high levels of “transient”
institutional ownership is associated with overweighting of short-term earning value and
underweighting of long-term earning value, and concluding that the finding supports the notion
that such ownership provides fund managers incentives for favoring short-term earnings over
long-term value).
66. See Hendry et al., supra note 62, at 237.
67. See José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholder Investment
Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 136, 138–39 (2005).
68. Cf. id. at 138, 158–59 (finding that buyer firms with short-term investors have had worse
underperformance in the long-run).
69. Wong, supra note 63, at 406.
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Next, it will be argued that the regard that institutions need to have for
the wider context or public interest is also contrary to a shareholdercentered contractarian model of corporate governance.
2. Wider Good
The rhetoric in the Walker Review refers to “social legitimacy” in the
institutional shareholders’ role, based on a “view . . . shared by the public”
and by stakeholder groups.70 Hence, institutional shareholders’ governance
role is not only based on contractarian speak and the agency problem.
Rather, it is now stated that the role should be supported by public and
stakeholder perception.71 This view can only be reconciled with the
shareholder-centered contractarian ideology if we regard the public and
stakeholders as all part of the contractarian fabric. Nonetheless, that would
conflate the private nature of the corporation supported by the contractarian
theory and the social purpose of the corporation supported by
communitarian theories. Hence, how should we interpret the call to “social
legitimacy” within the existing theoretical frameworks? Is social legitimacy
and public interest to be accommodated within the contractarian ideology or
without? If the contractarian theory regards corporate governance as
essentially an issue of private order, then “public interest” notions are only
accounted for in terms of market failures. But the Walker Review seems to
go beyond market failures.
Shareholder-centered contractarian ideology regards market failures to
be impediments to shareholder monitoring due to information asymmetry or
bargaining failures.72 To overcome such market failures, the existing legal
framework already provides for securities disclosure regulation to empower
institutional shareholders with information. Mandatory company law rules
on general meetings, voting, and institutional shareholders’ approval for
specific transactions73 facilitate shareholder monitoring and provide
shareholder rights to overcome such market failures. The rhetoric in the
Walker Review pertaining to “stewardship” does not deal with the market
failures surrounding institutional shareholders’ monitoring role. Rather, it
deals with ideas of social welfare—making shareholder monitoring
beneficial to the wider community at large, and such wider community not
being captured within the private order of the contractarian framework.
Further, it will be discussed that shareholder stewardship, under the
comply-or-explain regime, is also envisaged to become publicly
70. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, ¶ 5.7.
71. Id.
72. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1463–64, 1520, 1524 (1989).
73. Examples include substantial transactions or interested transactions. See Companies Act,
2006, c. 46, §§ 190–214 (U.K.).
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accountable, thereby explaining the Walker Review’s reference to the duty
of stewardship as a construct of “social legitimacy” that complements the
limited liability enjoyed by institutional shareholders.
In sum, it is argued that the contextual framing of “stewardship” moves
away from a shareholder-centered contractarian ideology of corporate
governance. This is because “stewardship” does not accept the natural
tendency of short-termism as an investment tenet, and thus introduces
limitations to the contractarian freedom enjoyed by institutional
shareholders in determining how best to deal with their investments.
Additionally, the references to wider good in the Walker Review do not
cohere with the private nature of shareholder monitoring under the
shareholder-centered contractarian model of corporate governance. Further,
the Financial Reporting Council now subjects the Stewardship Code to a
comply-or-explain regime and encourages institutions’ investment
managers, proxy voting agencies, and even foreign investors who now own
more than 40 percent of the U.K.’s publicly listed equity,74 to adhere to the
Stewardship Code. This Article argues that the comply-or-explain regime
would also contradict the private nature of shareholder monitoring. Not
only is shareholder monitoring subject to a form of normativization in the
Principles of the Code mentioned above, institutional shareholders are
themselves accountable under the comply-or-explain regime. Hence, the
Stewardship Code does not seem to encourage the view that shareholder
monitoring is a private activity framed by the contractarian and agency
paradigms.
It could be argued that institutions are accountable to their beneficiaries
anyway, but this Article argues that the accountability framed under the
comply-or-explain regime is different from that under fund management
trusteeship, which is based on private law. The nature of accountability
envisaged in the Stewardship Code is more public than private in nature.
Principles 1, 2, 5, and 6 require public disclosure by institutions in relation
to their stewardship responsibilities and the rendering of such.75 Such public
disclosure would likely be monitored by the Financial Reporting Council
and policy-makers, and hence the accountability in the discharge of
stewardship is not limited to fund beneficiaries. The comply-or-explain
model is likely to facilitate monitoring of institutional engagement, not by
beneficiaries, but by policy-makers. Beneficiaries are likely to be too
74. Statistics as of December 2010. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, OWNERSHIP OF UK
QUOTED SHARES 2010 (Feb. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778
_257476.pdf.
75. UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princs. 1, 2, 5, 6. Principle 1 deals with the
monitoring policy generally, Principle 2 focuses on how institutions manage conflicts of interest
in discharging stewardship responsibilities, Principle 5 requires public disclosure of any policies
on collective engagement, and Principle 6 requires voting records to be publicly disclosed or an
explanation for their nondisclosure. Id.
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dispersed and indifferent to relate the engagement activities of their pension
funds or insurance companies to the long-term performance of their
savings. Hence, the Stewardship Code is intended to steer the modus of
monitoring by institutional shareholders, not only for the purposes of
protecting their private investment interests, but also as an exercise of
governance that may deliver social good. Public disclosure also assists
policy-makers and relevant regulators to understand and discern the impact
of shareholder engagement on corporations, and possibly also establishes a
platform of intelligence for policy-makers to consider options in
governance. Principle 7 requires disclosure of details of the discharge of
stewardship to beneficiaries, but does not say that such disclosure should be
publicly made.76 Still, the institutions’ trade bodies, such as the National
Association of Pension Funds and the Investment Management Association,
publish almost yearly surveys going into some detail of how institutions
engage and what is achieved. Hence, it is argued that institutional
engagement will be looked at most closely by policy-makers and regulators,
rather than by dispersed individual beneficiaries. Individual beneficiaries
are unlikely to make the connections between how institutional stewardship
in shareholder engagement translates into investment performance, or the
ultimate provision of retirement or long-term savings. On the other hand,
policy-makers and regulators would be interested in the quasi-governance
role of institutions in the regulatory space.
It can, however, be argued that the Stewardship Code represents a set of
hypothetical default bargains that institutions would have struck with their
beneficiaries, and that it does not depart from a dominantly private interest
paradigm. But this Article argues that the Stewardship Code is unlikely to
reflect beneficiaries’ preferences. Beneficiaries are likely to prefer that
institutions have the freedom to engage as well as to sell, and would not
likely place undue emphasis on engagement. As Tsuk-Mitchell explains, the
key conceptualization of an “investor” has been one whose primary right is
to sell out if unhappy with the investment, and not necessarily to participate
in the internal reform of companies.77 Further, the hypothetical default
bargain model breaks down especially in relation to Principle 5. Why would
beneficiaries necessarily think that collective engagement by institutions in
times of economic stress would be the ideal default bargain? Would not
beneficiaries prefer institutions to rationally engage in individual wealthmaximizing behavior in order to address their investment interests?
Although the Stewardship Code is soft law, this Article is of the view that
the approach of the Stewardship Code to normativizing aspects of
shareholder monitoring, in addition to its comply-or-explain nature,
76. Id. princ. 7.
77. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Institutional Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1514, 1563–64, 1570 (2006).
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supports taking the view that the Stewardship Code signals the shifting
away from a private contractarian approach to shareholder monitoring.
Institutional shareholders are not merely required to align their private
interests with wider concerns, but possibly to do more, as engagement,
monitoring, public reporting, and collective engagement all require positive
effort and cost.
In the next Part, this Article will argue that although the Stewardship
Code contains principles that indicate a move away from shareholdercentered contractarianism, the theoretical shift does not swing to a
communitarian conception of the corporation. This Part will suggest that the
theoretical shift is based on elements of stakeholder theory, in particular
elevating the position of the state as “key stakeholder” in the context of the
U.K. bank bailout in 2008–2009.
III. THE RISE OF THE “KEY STAKEHOLDERS”
This Part first examines the models of communitarian theories in
corporate governance, and argues that the Walker Review and the
Stewardship Code, nevertheless, do not encourage a total embrace of
communitarian theories of corporate governance. It will also argue,
however, that the developments in the Walker Review and the Stewardship
Code embody a limited conception of the stakeholder theory, what this
Article will refer to as a “key stakeholders” approach.
A. THE COMMUNITARIAN MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
THEORY
Although the contractarian theory dominates corporate governance
theory and legal frameworks, the corporation has not always been regarded
merely as a private order of arrangements. Berle’s and Dodd’s writings in
the 1930s conceive of the corporation as a social entity and institution
producing social impact, although they disagree on the channels of
accountability for directors.78

78. Compare A. A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049, 1074 (1931) (arguing that corporate powers must only be used for the ratable benefit of
shareholders because, substantively, corporate law should be viewed as a more flexible branch of
the law of trusts), with E. Merrick Dodd, For whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (arguing that while Berle’s “trustee” theory is generally
agreeable, it is disagreeable to view corporations as solely profit-makers for shareholders because
corporations have social utility and should therefore bear responsibility for stakeholders), with
Adolf A. Berle, For whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: a Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365,
1367–68, 1370 (1932) (responding to Dodd by arguing that, in practice, the social utility of a
corporation exists in the large number of shareholders and through their interconnectedness with
other members of society, and that until a “clear and reasonably enforceable scheme” is
developed, corporate responsibility should be directed toward making profits for shareholders).
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Communitarian models of corporate law grasp the phenomenon that the
sum of the corporation and its power are greater than its constituent parts,
and therefore view corporate power as a social issue of concern. The
concession theory posits that corporations are creatures of statute, and
hence, there is not only a sense of public purpose in their existence, but that
the state is also placed in an unquestioning position to impose regulation on
corporations.79 This is possibly the earliest conception of a communitarian
model of the corporation, derived from the chartered corporation in the
eighteenth century. The concession theory is based on the organized
collectivity of the corporation as an extension of certain social purposes,
such as infrastructural building (railways) or empire building (companies
that governed and exploited colonial resources such as the East India
Company).80
The concession theory has long waned in persuasion but communitarian
conceptions of the corporation remain as theorists continue to observe a
“semi-public” character in the organized collectivity of the corporation—
the “real entity.” Dodd observes that the “real entity” of the corporation is
regulable and regulated, as its internal processes and its products entail
social consequences such as employee relations, products liability,
consumer rights, and so on.81 As corporations become major employers,
centers of consumer outputs, and economic engines of growth, Kaysen
comments that corporate power becomes social and political power.82 The
investment of corporations into research or innovation may determine the
economic growth of specific industries and public investment into
education and training: the economic significance of corporations extends
beyond efficiency and output to social progressiveness and distribution.83
Marketing carried out by corporations shape social perceptions and
consciousness, and eventually culture.

79. Mahoney argues that the statutory intervention only followed developments in the
mercantile community that had been attempting to achieve the separateness of business activities
from personal assets through various other means such as contract and trust, and hence the claims
of the concession theory are overrated. See Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay
on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 884, 887–88, 892–93 (1999); see also
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 937–38, 965–
66, 971, 992–93 (1984) (noting that even if corporate personality is now enshrined in statute, it
does not mean that the corporation is of a public character or that a regulatory fiat over it is
warranted).
80. See, e.g., JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21, 47–49 (2003). Yet, Mahoney would argue that charters
are for more self-interested purposes such as securing a monopoly. Mahoney, supra note 79, at
887.
81. See Dodd, supra note 78, at 1148, 1150–51, 1153, 1161–62.
82. Carl Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 99 (Edward Sagendorph Mason ed., 1975).
83. See id., at 93, 94–96, 100, 102–03.
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The “semi-public” character of the corporation is arguably minimized
in the contractarian approach, which focuses on the “parts” of the
corporation rather than its sum,84 and thus, produces a de-socializing and
de-politicizing effect upon the trajectory of corporate law scholarship.85
Contractual theorists also argue that the transactional actors in the
corporation are often assumed to be rational transactors with narrow foci on
economic objectives such as resource allocation,86 asset partitioning,87 and
economic gain.88 Such a depiction of the transacting actors in the nexus
dehumanizes these actors89 and encourages self-interested atomistic
behavior such as “shirking and sharking”90 to arise. The conception of the
corporation in individualistic terms under the contractarian theory is
arguably responsible for perpetuating the behavioral problems of
managerial power and “sharking”—that is, shareholder power exercised for
selfish and short-termist objectives.91 Yet, the communitarian theorists who
look at the sum of the corporation as well as its parts are not quite in
agreement as to what the alternative vision might encompass.92

84. See generally Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L.
REV. 391 (1997) (examining the contractarian-communitarian debate, and arguing that traditions
of contractarian theory have some overlap with communitarian premises and that corporate law
may be viewed through a contractarian lens as being reliant on non-legally enforced social norms).
85. Professor Tsuk-Mitchell argues that the economic focus of corporate law steers corporate
theory into the safe haven that is strictly opposite to the Marxist/leftist conceptions of corporate
law, which are more social in nature, in an age when the cold war still loomed large. Dalia Tsuk,
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1861, 1864, 1909–11 (2003).
86. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANISATION 17–18, 20–22 (1974).
87. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
Yale L.J. 387, 392–94 (2000).
88. DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 107–08 (1990).
89. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Corporate Law] (citing ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON (1992)); Alan
Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673,
1688 (1993); see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust, Contract, Process, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 185, 194–97 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
90. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 265, 327 (1998).
91. “Shirking” is characterized as an agent “slacking off” to the detriment of the principal,
while “sharking” is characterized as the principal’s abuse of power and authority to the detriment
of the agent. Id. at 278, 280.
92. See Joel Seligman, Foreword to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 89, at ix–x.
For a critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, see generally Stephen Bainbridge,
Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997).
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B. THE CORPORATION AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT AND CITIZEN
One communitarian conception of the corporation is that it is an
organized collective that is part of the social fabric. This perspective places
importance on the external and collective dimension of the corporation as a
“real entity” in society and community, and therefore, demands are placed
on corporations to have legal and social rights and duties and to participate
in social life. Earlier commentators, such as Blumberg, see corporations as
having a role to play in mitigating racial inequality in America by
promoting equal opportunities in employment, and by being involved in
philanthropy and social giving.93 Parkinson, commenting in the 1990s, also
advocates that “social activism” is part-and-parcel of corporate
responsibility, involving charitable giving and support for community.94
This is also consistent with Mitchell’s and Ripken’s arguments that the
corporation should be perceived as a “person,” and hence corporate law
should play a part in “humanizing” the corporate personality in order to
encourage a holistic existence of the corporation within the social fabric.95
Wheeler, in the U.K., advocates that corporations should participate
actively in the social fabric, partnering regional development causes and
steering profit-making along virtue ethics in order to become a “social
citizen.”96 Solomon, in his contribution to the Progressive Corporate Law
volume, also advocates the communitarian conception of the corporation as
a form of humanomics—that is, a collective entity that may be formed not
only for private enterprise, but also for responsible and sustainable use of
resources, including labor.97
The “socialization” of the corporation, as discussed above, is, however,
not the dominant paradigm in the communitarian camp. The concern with
adopting this communitarian perspective as the theory of the corporation is
that the notions of libertarian rights in property and contract may be
undermined.98 This undermining of libertarian notions of individualist
empowerment may give way to regulatory intervention and control, thereby
allowing the regulatory state to assume concentrated power over economic
93. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 BUS. LAW. 1551, 1551,
1582–84, 1586–87 (1971).
94. JOHN E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 266–67, 290–92 (1993).
95. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 105–06, 175–77 (2009);
Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, supra note 89, 1487–88.
96. SALLY WHEELER, CORPORATIONS AND THE THIRD WAY 38–39, 42–44, 53, 71–72, 79–80
(2002).
97. Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by
Modern Publicly Held Corporations—A Critical Assessment, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 89, at 281, 281–82.
98. Some discussion of the undermining of libertarian individual rights conceptions in the rise
of the administrative state may be found in Jerry L. Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal
Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129 (1983).
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activities. The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the rise of the
administrative state in western economies such as the United States and
U.K. (developments in the welfare and administrative state in the U.K. were
arguably proliferated under the Labour government elected in 1945).99
Perhaps private contractarian principles underlying corporate theory and
law have been serving a countervailing ideological purpose.
C. EXTERNALITIES-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF THE CORPORATION
Another group of commentators advocate the communitarian
conception of the corporation based on the social externalities caused by
corporate activities. Greenfield, for example, writes extensively on the
social costs resulting from corporate activities and calls for corporate law to
be treated as “public law” in order to regulate externality-creating
behavior.100 The “socialization” of the corporate entity may be manifest in
specific regulation such as health and safety legislation, employment
legislation, consumer protection and fair trading, anti-competitive
regulation, occupier’s liability, products liability, and so on.101 These laws
could intervene in internal corporate processes in order to achieve certain
social outcomes. Products liability laws affect internal processes of quality
control and checking; laws on equal opportunities demand internal
processes to be put in place in order to monitor equal opportunities and
create feedback processes. Bruner argues that, where the U.K. is concerned,
the wide range of specific regulatory laws in respect of defined social issues
such as employment rights, product safety, and so on, means that there is
less need for corporate law to deal with such matters in corporate

99. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH & G. DE N. CLARK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND: 1750–
1950, at 464–66 (1989).
100. See generally KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006) [hereinafter
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW] (challenging the dominant view of corporate
law by showing that changes to the basic assumptions of corporate law and corporations could
have positive results, and proposing some changes that may be achievable); Kent Greenfield, New
Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 89 (2005) [hereinafter Greenfield, New
Principles for Corporate Law] (prescribing five principles for corporate regulation, founded upon
the interests of society, that may further the public good).
101. See generally William W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59 (2005) (examining the objectives of corporate law; explaining why such
objectives create resistances toward social responsibility and stakeholder empowerment; and
explaining how corporate law has actually mediated tensions created in the shareholder-manager
agency relationship in an “open-ended” and “piecemeal” manner, notwithstanding the theories
posited for managing such tensions); Robert John Schultze, Book Note, Can This Marriage be
Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate Governance Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1607 (1997) (arguing that external regulation targeting specific issues is the right approach to
govern issues of a social effect resulting from corporate activity, and that it is wrong to reach into
internal governance for the purposes of regulating for social effects).
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governance.102 He argues that the greater presence of the welfare state in the
U.K., and a gamut of specific social legislation, make it unnecessary for
corporate law to cater to so many stakeholder “constituents” and social
issues, hence placing the emphasis in corporate law on the internal private
order of corporate governance.103 Instead of “socializing” the corporate law,
public regulatory law may have the effect of trimming the parameters of
corporate law so that it is concerned only with an internal core, thus
maintaining the contractarian conception of corporate law.
This Article agrees with Bruner’s observations that social issues,
especially with regard to externalities, are often treated as outside of
corporate law. Although the imposition of such regulatory law would
undoubtedly change corporate and business practice, such public regulatory
law is based on defined third-party externalities and does not purport to
govern internal operations and corporate governance directly. This is why,
notwithstanding that corporate governance codes have been promulgated as
a response to social disquiet following the fall of the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International in 1991,104 perceptions of excessive executive
remuneration in 1995,105 and most recently, the social costs resulting from
the global financial crisis of 2008–2009,106 such codes have remained as
soft law in the U.K.
Do the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code support the rise of a
communitarian theory of corporate governance, given their seemingly
common sympathy for public interest and wider good? This Article argues
that they do not embrace the communitarian conception of socializing the
corporation.
The Stewardship Code does not seem to subscribe to the communitarian
theories that are explicit on social activism. Where the Stewardship Code
gets the closest to social activism, namely Principles 4 and 5, it is actually
ambivalent about social activism. Principle 4 encourages institutions to
monitor and consider the escalation of engagement where there are risks in
respect of social and environmental matters. This may come close to a call
toward activism for social responsibility. As discussed in Part I, however,
the risks in respect of social and environmental matters may also refer to
102. See Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 583–86, 603, 622, 634, 637–39, 649–653 (2010).
103. See id. In general, Bruner’s argument is that, in comparing the U.S. and U.K. climates, the
amount of regulation, outside corporate law, protecting the interests of constituents other than
shareholders, is inversely proportional to the amount of regulation, inside corporate law, required
to safeguard such interests.
104. CADBURY REPORT, supra note 28, at 9, 11.
105. STUDY GROUP ON DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION, DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT
OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY 7, 11–12 (1995) [hereinafter
GREENBURY REPORT], available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=131.
106. WALKER REVIEW, supra note 2, at 9–12.
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short-term and long-term financial risks to the company and to investors.
As academic literature is still divided on the exact impact of corporate
social responsibility on the financial performance of companies, Principle 4
does not rule out financially-focused behavior. Principle 5 calls upon
institutions to collectively engage in times of wider economic stress, and
this again may seem to be an endorsement for social activism. In light of the
context of the global financial crisis, however, Principle 5 may be better
read as collective activism in order to safeguard the viability of a
corporation so that its failure may not trigger contagion or systemic risk
effects to the industry and to other sectors. Principle 5 does not advocate the
socialization of any particular corporation to serve social purposes, and is
perhaps closer to externality mitigation. On the whole, there does not seem
to be a clear antithetical shift away to “communitarianize” or “socialize” the
nature of the corporation, as advocated by the first strand of communitarian
theorists discussed above.
The theoretical shift that may be represented by the Walker Review and
the Stewardship Code is not toward the archetypal opposite of shareholdercentered contractarianism—communitarianizing the corporation. Rather,
although not in the way stakeholder theorists advocate in terms of access
and participation rights in corporate governance, the theoretical shift is
closer to embodying a form of stakeholder theory. Neither the Stewardship
Code nor the Corporate Governance Code107 goes as far as to address
participatory rights for stakeholders, which is a key feature in the
stakeholder models to be discussed below. Hence, the Stewardship Code
cannot be regarded as embracing “stakeholder theory” as such, but possibly
only as infusing certain stakeholder elements into an extended form of
shareholder-centered contractarianism. This approach will be referred to as
the “key stakeholders” approach in this Article.
D. STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Stakeholder theory is not strictly speaking a “communitarian view” as it
does not emphasize the social purpose or nature of a corporation. Rather, it
is a “processual” perspective, asking for stakeholders to be co-opted into
corporate governance either by participation or by disclosure and
accountability.108 Still, there seems to be an almost natural convergence
107. See sources cited supra notes 4–5.
108. Although some theorists go for stakeholder duties as well, others argue that activist
institutional shareholders should be imposed with a fiduciary duty. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout,
Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1262–65, 1307 (2006). The
extension of duties in substantive law is not supported though. See Richard Saliterman,
Perceptions Bearing on the Public Policy Dynamics of Corporation Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV.
261, 288, 331 (1996) (arguing that all constituents in the corporation are in it for self-interested
purposes as well, and the needs of individual liberty could be severely compromised by ill-defined
legal duties).
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between theories sympathetic to the communitarian conception of corporate
law and theories supporting increased involvement of stakeholders in
corporate governance. This convergence appeals as the widening of the
constituency base of the corporation draws more of society or community
into the “boundary”109 of the corporation, arguably giving such
“participation” a social or semi-public character. On the other hand, can
such participation be open to all? If such participation cannot be open to all,
then the selection of which stakeholders matter would create an inclusiveexclusive effect, which may not differ from the wider contractarian
conception of the corporation that includes a broad range of constituents
beyond the organs of the company. In this respect, communitarian theories
which ultimately emphasize processual approaches and stakeholder
engagement may arguably not be very different in character from a
contract-plus conception of the corporation. Nevertheless, stakeholder
theories have the potential of introducing diverse negotiation in the
“contractarian” order of the corporation, whereby the basis upon which
stakeholders may be enrolled could be framed around alternative concepts
such as externalities, justice, and social legitimacy, beyond capital-centered
agency concepts.
Early commentators suggest a form of stakeholder participation that is
open to the public: that of the public election of directors of significantly
large corporations such as General Motors in the United States,110 or of
instituting “public directors” that have public accountability for the social
effects of corporate decisions.111 These rather dated but bold proposals
reach into corporate governance in order to regulate corporate decisionmaking and activity, not merely as a private enterprise, but as a social
construct.
More contemporary commentators such as Freeman define stakeholders
as “suppliers, customers, employees, [owners], the local community, and
[managers].”112 This definition of “stakeholder” is based on the scope of
persons who may be able to enter into a “Fair Contract” with the
corporation.113 Greenfield advocates that stakeholders should be able to

109. There has been interesting research in economic geography on how the boundaries of the
firm may be defined, and whether modern technological innovations changing the interface of
firm interaction with “outsiders” now makes many “outsiders” part of the “firm” itself. See
generally UNDERSTANDING THE FIRM: SPATIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS (Michael
Taylor & Päivi Oinas eds., 2006) (addressing, from an economic geography perspective, the gaps
and fragmented thinking present in certain theories of the firm).
110. Blumberg, supra note 93, at 1560.
111. Arthur S. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 91 (1979).
112. R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in THE
CORPORATION AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS 126 (Max B.E. Clarkson ed., 1998).
113. See id. at 126, 129–34.
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elect directors and share in the gains of the corporation;114 but, of particular
relevance, his treatise, focusing greatly on the lack of redistributive justice
to employees, argues for a fiduciary duty to be owed to employees due to
the failures of relational contracting between corporations and
employees.115 Sheehy advocates “stakeholder” participation in holding
corporations to account for, and to benefit from, the distribution of gains
from corporations.116 This version of stakeholder theory is based on a
“justice” model that regards stakeholders as those who could be negatively
affected by corporate activities. The externality connection then justifies
Sheehy’s view that corporate gains should contribute to stakeholder wealth,
and not just to the private wealth of capital providers, in order to
compensate for such stakeholders’ forbearance of negative externalities.
On the whole, although stakeholder theory again internalizes the
conception of the corporation into a web of relationships, and does not
communitarianize the corporation,117 stakeholder theory is more
“progressive” in nature, as it allows the boundaries of accountability to be
widened and allows for the enrollment of stakeholders based on concepts
such as externalities, social legitimacy, and justice. With the dominance of
the law and economics movement, and of libertarian political ideologies,
the contractarian conception of corporate law as essentially private118 is an
enduring one. Hence, it is not surprising that stakeholder theories do not
advocate a completely public form of accountability.
The Stewardship Code does not embrace stakeholder theory in terms of
direct access to, and participation in, corporate governance. The real
ideological shift in the Stewardship Code and the role of shareholder
governance, in general, is a more nuanced one. The following will argue
that the Walker Review and the Stewardship Code move toward embracing
a key stakeholder, but not stakeholders generally. In the context of the
global banking crisis which has given rise to the Walker Review and the
Stewardship Code, the key stakeholder is the state or the relevant regulator.
It will be argued that the Stewardship Code embraces a form of nuanced
participation for the state or relevant regulator as “key stakeholder,” in the
form of shareholder stewardship as accountability. The indirect nature of
114. Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, supra note 100, at 108–09, 115.
115. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 100, at 63, 154, 159–70
(arguing that extending a fiduciary duty to employees would increase “fairness,” which, in turn,
would build the “trust and cooperation” required for “relational” contracting).
116. Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193, 235, 239–40 (2005).
117. See generally David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 89, at 1 (discussing and
evaluating non-contractarian approaches to corporate law).
118. The dominance of the contractarian conception of corporate law is discussed in BRIAN R.
CHEFFINS, THE TRAJECTORY OF (CORPORATE LAW) SCHOLARSHIP: INAUGURAL LECTURE AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, OCTOBER 2003, at 43–57, 62–66 (2004).
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the state’s role in the Stewardship Code attempts to introduce some balance
to the shareholder-centered contractarian model of corporate governance
without appearing to reintroduce concession type theories to reregulate
economic activity by the back door. Yet, it may also be said that such a
narrow and limited ideological move achieves little in introducing greater
public interest rhetoric in corporate governance theory which has, for too
long, been dominated by a private and insular contractarian paradigm. Part
IV addresses this debate.
E. THE KEY STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
The context of the Stewardship Code is represented by the Walker
Review of shortcomings in the corporate governance of banks and financial
institutions, and how such sub-optimal governance has affected the U.K.
banking crisis 2008–2009. For banks and systemically important financial
institutions,119 the potential for state bailout, in times of crisis or failure,
exists in order to prevent cascading devastating effects upon the financial
sector and the general economy.120 Thus, where a failure of a systemically
important bank or financial institution looms, it is not merely the
shareholders and creditors of the institution that stand to bear residual risks
and loss, the state may also be placed in a similar position. Such bailout
would, however, benefit and protect shareholders and creditors at the
expense of public money.121 In this context, an institutional shareholders’
“residual claimant” role in the contractarian paradigm may be mitigated by
ultimate state support; hence, it could be argued that their monitoring role is
no longer entirely “free” in the private contractarian sense, and that the
state’s potential liability is to be regarded as a “stake.” Such a stake could
either be supported by direct access and participation as per stakeholder
theory, or by shareholder accountability, so that shareholder monitoring
gives cognizance to, and is accountable for, the state’s “stake.”
The state’s “stake” provides countervailing pressures to shareholders’
private contractarian pursuits which would naturally be self-centered and
short-termist. The state as a stakeholder, however, is not framed in the
terms that stakeholder theorists would expect in terms of direct participation
and/or accountability. In this Article’s view, the state’s “stake” is expressed
119. Systemically important financial institutions means financial institutions whose collapse
may trigger a series of devastating effects upon other institutions and the market generally,
thereby affecting general economic well-being. See Rosa Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs and
Financial Stability, 6 CAP. MARKETS L. J. 197, 198–200, 209 (2011).
120. See id.
121. It has been argued that the position of the government is in need of recognition in bank and
financial institution corporate governance. See, e.g., Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of
Banks after the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evidence, Reforms §§ 2, 4.3.2.1 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 151/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1448118.
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indirectly through the accountability, or “stewardship,” of institutions.
Hence, the accountability inherent in the stewardship concept applies, in the
particular case of financial institutions, to the accountability of shareholders
to the state as a “key stakeholder” that mitigates shareholders’ residual risk.
Nevertheless, in order to prevent open-ended policy interference by the
state, “stewardship” has seven defined features and principles in the
Stewardship Code.122 Thus, the ideological shift introduced by the
Stewardship Code is an indirect recognition of a “key stakeholder” based on
shareholder accountability.
Yet, can this be said to be an ideological shift in corporate governance
generally? The state’s “stake” in systemically important financial
institutions may be argued to be unique to the financial sector. A number of
commentators123 have argued that banks are special enterprises because they
rely much more on deposits and other loans as a source of finance than on
equity, and that, therefore, since losses would be shared with a large base of
creditors, equity holders would prefer higher risk-taking in order to
maximize returns. The corporate governance incentives in banks are thus
likely to be in favor of risk-taking that exceeds what may be socially
optimal. In this light, regulatory intervention such as micro-prudential
regulation is warranted, and the role of the state as some form of a
stakeholder is arguably more acceptable as a force mitigating market failure
and potential social cost.
Even if we accept that the state may be in a unique position of being a
“key stakeholder” in the financial sector, it is not inconceivable that the
state could be a “key stakeholder” in other sectors. State bailout has already
occurred in another industry in the United States—the automotive industry.
Policy-makers can determine that, besides banks, other industries have
become socially or systemically important, although this does not
necessarily mean that the state is always a “key stakeholder” in such
industries. Indeed, this Article also suggests that besides the state as a
potential “key stakeholder” in some sectors, the “key stakeholder” concept
can be extended to encompass other stakeholders besides the state.
The context of the banking crisis and unique corporate governance
incentives in banks may be distinguished from corporate governance in
other sectors. The Stewardship Code, however, has chosen to apply more
broadly to the corporate sector. This Article argues that the extension of the
Stewardship Code to other corporate sectors can be ideologically based on a
new “key stakeholder” approach that can be extrapolated from the position
of the state in relation to financial institutions and such other systemically
122. For the specific principles of “stewardship,” refer to UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note
5.

123. See Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 253,
258–61, 275–76 (2010); Mülbert, supra note 121, §§ 4.1, 4.2.1–2.2, 6.
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important corporations as policy-makers may determine. Such a “key
stakeholder” approach is capable of being coherent and can bring about
ideological changes to corporate governance theory.
The “key stakeholder” position of the state, in relation to financial and
other possibly systemically significant institutions, is based on the potential
that the state may “bail out” or mitigate shareholders’ residual risk. The
state could be a “key stakeholder” in sectors where there may be high levels
of economic output or employment so that the social and economic
significance of certain corporations may entail a characterization as
“systemically or socially significant.”124 Further, other stakeholders in
relation to other industries may also be placed in a similar position: that is,
having the liability to absorb or mitigate residual risk without participatory
rights in corporate governance. For example, the author of this Article has
heard informally that some companies in the U.K. have implemented salary
sacrifice schemes in order to report favorable finances during the economic
downturn of 2008–2009 and to support the paying of dividends to
shareholders. The role of employees in such a case could arguably amount
to one of providing mitigation to shareholders’ residual risk. Such
employees could be elevated to a “key stakeholder” position so that
shareholder monitoring should take into account of, and be accountable to,
them.
A “key stakeholder” may be identified as one that mitigates
shareholders’ residual risk, taking on a role of loss absorption or sharing.
One is reminded of the Coasean bargain with respect to social cost125: that
constituents affected by the cost of corporate activity may weigh the costs
and benefits of such activity and come to actions that proportionately
balance their private benefit derived from such activity against the private
and social cost incurred. Hence, any “loss absorption” by stakeholders must
be balanced against the private benefit that they obtain from the result of
corporate activity; for example, manufacturing socially desirable goods.126
In Coasean terms, “loss absorption” is framed within a private give-and-

124. Currently, the term “systemically important” is used only in relation to financial
institutions. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(Nov.
2011),
available
at
http://www
.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.
125. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3, J.L. & Econ. 1, 2, 9–10 (1960)
(examining the relationship between the Coasean bargain and social costs, and arguing that
because a benefit somewhere is accompanied with a detriment elsewhere, and because a corrective
measure to cure that detriment is accompanied by yet another detriment, the total net effect of all
benefits and detriments should be regarded).
126. Such balancing is evident in the manufacture of paper products by plants that emit
sulfurous odors. Paper products are socially desirable but odors are not, and where the community
surrounding the plant is also employed by the plant, one can see the tensions that arise between
the private benefit and the private and social costs.
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take paradigm between stakeholders and the corporation, and is not
socialized into a public interest issue.
The “key stakeholder” approach may be accommodated within the
contractarian paradigm of the corporation; and where the “key stakeholder”
is the state, the contractarian web is widened to include the state and the
constituents it represents. Such an approach has the potential of introducing
wider social interest elements into a contractarian paradigm due to the
private and public nature of “key stakeholders.”
This Article argues that the “key stakeholder” approach is not
inherently contradictory. Such an approach does not threaten to subvert the
nature of the corporation or reintroduce communitarian concepts by the
back door. As the Coasean corporation has taken on new dimensions in
present times, from the local company to global multinational enterprises, it
is arguably apt to extend the essentially private paradigm of Coasean social
cost to embrace a mixture of private and wider social interest. This is
because the scale of externalities that may entail from global corporate
activity may become sufficiently significant.
It may rightly be said that identifying “key stakeholders” of global and
complex operations would likely be a diverse and complex exercise. There
may be diverse groups of conflicting interests and an array of social and
political driving forces supporting different groups to allow them to be
heard. Still, this does not mean that “everyone” should become a “key
stakeholder” and that the contractarian boundaries should collapse in favor
of a communitarian conception. The key quality of “key stakeholders” is
that they are in the position of mitigating shareholders’ residual risk in their
loss absorption capacity. This may include a group of involuntary tort
victims who have suffered from the cost-cutting measures of a corporation
compromising on health and safety, but may not include an occasional tort
victim of negligence. This Article acknowledges that there may be
complexity in ascertaining “key stakeholders,” and contests between
different groups of stakeholders, and between stakeholders and
corporations, are likely to exist. Nonetheless, the next Part will suggest that
the complex and negotiative landscape for stakeholders is not necessarily a
drawback.
In sum, there are two key ideological changes to the dominant
shareholder-centered contractarian theory that are offered by the “key
stakeholder” approach. First, the recognition of the key stakeholder’s
indirect stake in the corporation that calls shareholders to stewardship
mitigates shareholder-centric perspectives in corporate governance. Second,
the notion of social or public interest can be infused into corporate
governance theory either through the identity of the key stakeholder (for
example, the state) whose objective may lie in social or public interest, or
through the nature of the “stake” which may lie in preventing or mitigating
private and social costs as a result of corporate activity.
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This Article also regards the Stewardship Code as filling in where the
“enlightened shareholder value” approach is lacking. The “enlightened
shareholder value” approach recognizes the business case for asking
shareholders and directors to integrate stakeholder welfare into corporate
performance. Such an approach is instrumental127 in nature—that is to say,
that stakeholders are not given cognizance as such, but only because
stakeholder welfare may be related to the business case. The enlightened
shareholder value approach views stakeholders from a self-centered
perspective and is short of being really “enlightened”! The Stewardship
Code, however, uses shareholder stewardship to express and account for
another’s “stake.” This is an improvement from the instrumental view taken
by the “enlightened shareholder value” approach, as the “stake” is given
recognition as being other-centered, and not just perceived from the
perspective of the corporation or the shareholder. Although the expression
of the “stake” is not independent, and relies on shareholder stewardship, the
accountability notion inherent in stewardship is one step toward indicating
the other-centered nature of stewardship and away from the selfcenteredness of shareholder-centered contractarianism.
One critique against the “enlightened shareholder value” approach is
that it is unlikely to be effective in addressing stakeholder concerns without
accountability to, and participation by, stakeholders.128 This Article argues
that there is potential in the “stewardship” notion to make the indirectly
expressed “stake” count, and thereby edge toward ideologically
transforming corporate governance theory. The next Part will argue that
much of this ideological potential lies in how stewardship is called to
account, as the accountability of stewardship will show the extent to which
the indirect stake of “key stakeholders” can be expressed in corporate
governance.
IV. THE IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STEWARDSHIP
Although the Stewardship Code does not move very far from the
shareholder-centered contractarian paradigm, this Article argues that it is
mistaken to treat the “key stakeholder” approach, as embodied in the
Stewardship Code, as insubstantially consequential. This Part will explore
the possibilities in calling stewardship to account so that the “indirect stake”
of “key stakeholders” can be made to count. This Part will also explore the

127. See T. Donaldson & L.E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 65, 71, 77–78 (1995) (describing the instrumental theory as one that posits a positive
correlation between emphasizing stakeholder interests with positive business performance).
128. See generally Keay, Moving Towards Stakeholderism, supra note 47 (concluding that
section 172 of the 2006 Companies Act provides only an appearance of focus on stakeholder
interests).
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weaknesses in the “key stakeholder” approach that may undermine the
ideological developments suggested.
As mentioned earlier, the accountability of stewardship is subject to a
“comply or explain” regime, and such disclosure is likely to be scrutinized
to a greater extent by regulators and policy-makers than by diverse
beneficiaries in the institutions. What implications does this have for the
accountability of stewardship, the means by which the indirect stake of
“key stakeholders” is expressed?
As much of the disclosure that institutional shareholders have to make
in relation to stewardship is public disclosure,129 institutional shareholders
could be scrutinized in their stewardship role by regulators and policymakers as well as stakeholder groups.
A. THE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
Institutional shareholders may be scrutinized in their stewardship role
by regulators and policy-makers who consider institutions as a force for
governance. Contemporary scholarship in regulation theory has sought to
maximize the governance potential of diverse actors in the regulatory space,
as the state increasingly faces limitations in capacity, resources, and reach
in exercising governance and control.130 As institutional shareholders have
the proximity and resources to monitor investee corporations and actually
do monitor such corporations, there is potential for the monitoring role to
work as a force for governance. Regulators’ and policy-makers’ interest in
institutions’ governance role will likely shape the pressures surrounding
institutional accountability for stewardship.
For example, the European Commission has overtly suggested that
more effective “governance” of the corporate sector is needed. Its Green
Paper has recommended that “better monitoring” of the comply-or-explain
regimes of corporate governance codes in European Union (EU) Member
States needs to be in place. Extensive harmonization of corporate
governance codes in the EU has not yet taken place and Member States
have adopted different approaches to the degree of legalizing corporate
governance practices.131 Many EU Member States, however, have adopted
the U.K.’s flagship approach of treating the Corporate Governance Code as
soft law applying to listed companies and subjecting the listed companies to
129. See supra Part II.
130. See Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems, supra note 56, at 64, 84; Lobel, supra
note 56, at 344, 466; Scott, supra note 57, at 330, 347–52. See generally Black, Critical
Reflections on Regulation, supra note 56 (arguing that conceptualizing regulation as
“decentralized” will widen policy potential); Black, Mapping the Contours, supra note 56
(arguing that analyzing financial services regulation from a decentered perspective, supplemented
by “enrollment” analysis, may lead to improvements in the financial services regulatory system
and its accountability).
131. See Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2.
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a comply-or-explain approach.132 This comply-or-explain approach is
intended to enroll institutional shareholders into meaningful consideration
both of the corporate governance practices of their investee companies and
of any deviations from the best practices found in the respective codes. In
this respect, the comply-or-explain nature of corporate governance codes
supports the private nature of institutional shareholders’ monitoring role,
allowing them to decide on whether they are satisfied with the corporate
governance practices of their investee companies.
The Green Paper, however, observes that shareholder monitoring,
especially in respect of deviations from the corporate governance codes, is
lacking.133 This is because companies can get away with either not
providing explanations for deviations from the Stewardship Code, or
providing boilerplate and brief explanations that institutional shareholders
do not pursue further.134 The Commission is of the view that companies’
corporate governance disclosures and practices need to be better
monitored.135 Although it is not explicit what the perceived need for “better
monitoring” is based on, the Green Paper goes on to suggest that “securities
regulators, stock exchanges, or other authorities” could play a part in
contributing to the monitoring of corporate governance disclosures and
practices.136 This suggests that the Commission perceives a public interest
element in monitoring the corporate governance of listed companies.
Such a perception is not unfounded. Unchecked management may
perpetuate fraud or risky decisions that could result in corporate failure.
Corporate losses may not merely be regarded as a private matter of
shareholder and creditor loss, but may sometimes become a matter of social
loss affecting employees, stakeholders, and the community.137 Kay also
132. Examples of most EU Member State Codes may be found on the European Corporate
Governance Institute’s website. Index of All Codes, EUROPEAN CORP. GOVERNANCE INST.,
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
133. Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.1.
134. Arcot et al., supra note 27, at 193–94; see also Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, at
196–97 (examples of good and bad codes).
135. Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2.
136. Id. ¶ 3.2.
137. An example is the consequent social losses following major corporate failures such as
Royal Ahold and Enron. Commentators have attributed these corporate failures largely to
governance failures. Abe De Jong, Douglas V. De Jong, Peter Roosenboom & Gerard Mertens,
Royal Ahold: A Failure of Corporate Governance 2, 24 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 67/2005, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=663504; Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35
U. CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1157–58 (2003). There is a much more tenuous link between corporate
governance and generating positive social benefits through corporate social responsibility. See
Ron Baukol, Address at Caux Round Table, Tokyo, Japan: Corporate Governance and Social
Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2002), at 5–6, available at http://www.cauxroundtable.org/view_file.cfm
?fileid=30; Laura Starks, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: What Do
Investors Care About? What Should Investors Care About? (2009), EFA Keynote Speech at the
University of Texas at Austin, in 44 FIN. REV. 461, 467.
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writes of the failure of certain corporations as having more social and
stakeholder implications than others, and of possibly a need to move away
from the resistance against interfering with market-based forces when
corporations fail. In this sense, shareholder monitoring may be expected not
only to meet institutional shareholders’ private interests, but may function
as a form of “market-based governance” for public interest objectives.138
Market-based governance may be described as “the motivation of
private interests to further the public good.”139 This is consistent with
contemporary scholarship in regulation theory that posits seeking private
actors to contribute to the regulatory space as discussed earlier. The
European Commission is arguably affirming this perspective of shareholder
monitoring in its Green Paper, in considering how the weaknesses of
shareholder monitoring may be compensated for by enrolling, perhaps,
securities regulators to monitor listed companies’ corporate governance
disclosures and practices.140 Nevertheless, the implication of this is that
corporate governance codes may be closer to becoming practically hard or
regulatory law, as there is policy interest in scrutinizing adherence to the
codes and reasons for deviations. The Stewardship Code may thus, in light
of the Green Paper, be seen as a template for the governance role of
institutional shareholders, which is increasingly being overtly articulated
and could even be regulated in due course. In this light, there may be
effective regulatory scrutiny of how institutional shareholders carry out
stewardship and account for the wider purpose of corporate well-being and
performance.
B. SHAREHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER-COMPANY RELATIONS
Next, shareholder stewardship may be used to frame arguments
supporting shareholder activism and also arguments to check shareholder
activism. The “other-centered” nature of stewardship is a platform which
invites discourse. The company-shareholder-stakeholder relational
paradigm is taken beyond “bargaining” as the contractarian theory posits.
Rather, the discourse extends from “bargaining” to argument. Shareholders,
management, and stakeholders can advance a discourse of different
arguments. This new “negotiative” landscape of “argument” facilitates
greater critical scrutiny into and debate about corporate behavior.
138. See John Kay, New Rules to Protect the Many from the Few, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6fb99fa4-914c-11e0-b1ea-00144feab49a.html (arguing for special
insolvency regimes to deal with corporations whose social significance may be higher than others
upon failure, such as utilities companies, banks, and care homes).
139. Rahul Dhumale, An Incentive-Based Regulatory System: A Bridge Too Far 13 (ESRC
Centre for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 170, Jun. 2000), available at
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp170.pdf.
140. See Commission Green Paper, supra note 33, ¶ 3.2.
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Shareholder engagement in a company may wax or wane in influence
depending on a concept of “stakeholder salience.”141 The thesis is that
stakeholders (including shareholders) with salient demands may more likely
influence management, and hence, exert greater governance pressures in
their corporate governance roles. Salient demands are those that are backed
by power, legitimacy, or urgency. Power can only be exercised by
shareholders as the legal framework provides for voting, exit, and
engagement rights. Yet, legitimacy pressures could come from stakeholder
reports, social and media reports, and publicity. Legitimacy pressures could
also impact perceived urgency.
Shareholder engagement could thus be based on legitimacy and urgency
pressures that are exerted by stakeholder groups, even if the latter do not
have direct participation rights in corporate governance. Often, such
societal legitimacy is viewed by institutional shareholders as a useful
springboard for engagement.142 Companies can, however, also use societal
legitimacy or urgency pressures to countervail institutional engagement;
and such use may provide a useful check on selfish use of engagement
powers by institutional shareholders.143
As legitimacy and urgency can be derived from stakeholder concerns,
stakeholders, albeit with an indirect stake through shareholder stewardship,
could be practically important in exerting corporate governance influence.
Stewardship could be used to advance legitimate stakeholder concerns and
could also provide a check against institutions advancing selfish or
atomistic agenda that may not be welfare-inducing. A negotiative landscape
in corporate governance can thus arise where the company, institutional
shareholders, and the indirect representation of stakeholders’ legitimate or
urgent pressures interact. Although stakeholders do not have a direct voice,
and the dynamics of influence are shaped by institutional engagement and
corporate manipulation, stakeholders could use public media to manipulate
their arguments for legitimacy and/or urgency in order to shape the
negotiations and discourse in corporate governance.
The indirect power of stakeholders has been increasingly witnessed in
the exertion of social responsibility pressures on corporations. The
141. E. James M. Gifford, Effective Shareholder Engagement: The Factors that Contribute to
Shareholder Salience, 92 J. BUS. ETHICS 79, 96–97 (2010).
142. See id. at 81–82, 92–93.
143. For example, Rock has written extensively on his reservations on the benefits of
institutional shareholder activism. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and Uncertain
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 452–53, 505–06 (1991)
(arguing that managers of such institutional-investor-institutions have substantial disincentives,
but few incentives, to actively discipline corporate management and will, at best, be a
“disinterested champion”); cf. Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 988–90, 1030–31 (1994) (arguing that the risks of “relational”
investing are great and difficult to minimize and control).

2012]

International Shareholders as Stewards

425

Corporate Responsibility movement has produced a loop of discourse,
accountability in reporting, and perhaps also substantive change.144 The
template of stewardship more overtly supports the role of stakeholder-based
arguments in legitimacy and urgency and further invites possible scrutiny
from regulators and policy-makers, as discussed above. Hence, the indirect
stake of “key stakeholders” can be a powerful reflexive force for shaping
the governance role of institutional shareholders.
C. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LONG-TERMISM AND
STAKEHOLDER WELFARE
This Article also argues that business management research supporting
the correlation between long-termism and greater stakeholder welfare
would provide further impetus to support stakeholder arguments and their
influence in the stewardship accountability regime under the Stewardship
Code. Michael Porter advocates that contemporary businesses should turn
to a “shared value” model so that shared value redefines what value creation
means for business.145 “Shared value” incorporates long-term corporate
success with societal and general economic well-being, and sees the two as
mutually dependent and not contradictory.146 Porter’s strategic
recommendations include enhancing long-term stakeholder welfare, such as
being concerned for consumers and local communities, in tandem with the
development of business strategy for long-term profitability and success.147
This model endorses the correlation between the long-term well-being of a
company and the welfare of its stakeholders. White argues that business
strategic thinking needs to be attuned to “long term wealth” creation, a
concept that balances patient capital with sustainability and wider social and
economic welfare.148
These contemporary arguments move away from the shareholdercentric perspective that corporations are purposed to maximize shareholder
144. Corporate social responsibility reporting is perhaps seen as one of the greater achievements
in reflexive accountability undertaken by corporations to the wider public. See David Hess, Social
Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 82
(1999) (arguing that social reports, as reflexive law, provide enhanced information through all
levels of a corporation, thereby allowing the corporation to understand their stakeholders and vice
versa, and to respond appropriately). But see John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage,
Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement,
31 J. CORP. L. 1, 37–38 (2005) (empirical research suggesting that the corporate social
responsibility movement might not be succeeding and that even if it does succeed, such success
may not be desirable).
145. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: Redefining Capitalism and
the Role of the Corporation in Society, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 62, 64 (2011).
146. Id. at 64, 66, 68, 76.
147. Id. at 66, 68, 72–73, 76.
148. ALLEN L. WHITE, BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, WHAT IS LONG TERM WEALTH? 4–6,
8–9 (2007), available at http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_AWhite_Long-Term-Wealth.pdf.
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wealth and proposes to rewrite the hypothetical default bargain of all
contractarian constituents as that of the long-term well-being and success of
the company for all. The shared value concept would also be able to support
a wider “contractarian” paradigm of the company, in order to incorporate
different locations of value generation and receipt related to corporate
activity. As argued earlier, this ideological shift in fact changes the nature
of the contractarian paradigm to one that is not merely insular, shareholdercentric, and private, but may accommodate a range of broader stakeholder
interests which could be founded on social and communitarian concerns.
Hence, against the backdrop of both such ideological movements in
business management and the governance expectations of stewardship,
stewardship is not likely to merely be rhetoric for institutions to report as
they see fit. Stewardship may be a slow and evolutionary step away from
shareholder-centered contractarianism in corporate governance. It arguably
has the potential to change business strategic thinking in terms of longtermism and shared value and corporate governance practice and theory in
terms of stakeholder influence, and social and communitarian stakes.
Nonetheless, this Article will also point out that the stewardship
concept still suffers from some weaknesses that could undermine its
ideological ramifications. In particular, the stewardship concept does not
move away from giving shareholders a central governance role, and its
ideological stance may, hence, be weak and confused. Further, the
governance expectations of institutional shareholder stewardship may also
be over-estimated.
D. THE WEAKNESS OF THE STEWARDSHIP CONCEPT
It may be argued that the stewardship concept is ideologically weak as
it is still unclear as to whom shareholders are accountable as stewards. If the
accountability lies with beneficiaries, then beneficiaries are possibly too
indifferent and dispersed to hold institutions to account, and such
accountability does not add anything above the legal trusteeship duties
already owed. Yet, if “accountability” is something more, then the
Stewardship Code arguably does not clearly articulate to whom institutions
are accountable.
One of the reasons for this perceived weakness in articulating the
accountability channels may be that too much deference is still paid to the
shareholder-centric corporate governance framework. Policy-makers may
be too keen to avoid overtly introducing communitarian or stakeholder
theory models into corporate governance, as the introduction of such
models could cause both the theoretical and legal landscape to change
dramatically. Hence, shareholders remain central corporate governance
actors except that they are now required to be less atomistic, short-termist,
selfish, and should act as “stewards.” But if we cannot pinpoint for whom
institutions should act as stewards, then it becomes difficult to judge the
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exercise of stewardship and institutions can then dominate the definition of
stewardship. In other words, can the stake of the state or other stakeholders
be adequately expressed if shareholders are in control of developing
stewardship, engagement, and voting policies?149
One possible development in stewardship is that stewardship can be
seen as narrowly extending the criteria of assessment that institutions use in
evaluating their asset managers. Commentators have written extensively on
how asset managers are evaluated for short-term financial performance by
institutions,150 and although long-termism and the wider good are attributes
in the Stewardship Code that could pose challenges in reworking the
evaluation matrix,151 institutions could still develop narrowly-extended
evaluation matrices and confine the exercise of stewardship to a form of
monitoring over asset managers. Further, evaluation matrices for longtermism and the wider good could also become proceduralized and
subjective; that is, that institutions may look for the existence of corporate
policies dealing with social responsibility and stakeholder engagement
instead of critically considering the corporation’s substantive business
vision and strategy. Narrow-minded constructions of stewardship,
constructed in policies that institutions are responsible for developing,
could undermine the wider ideological developments toward stakeholder
accountability and “shared value.” Institutions may be tempted toward a
narrow-minded construction in order to simplify their “comply or explain”
obligation.
It may also be argued that the stewardship concept is doomed to be
ideologically weak as it is ideologically confused. It is an unhappy
patchwork: seeking to infuse some stakeholder and communitarian
concerns into the dominant shareholder-centered contractarian framework,
but unwilling to be bold enough to embark on the progressive changes. Just
because shareholders have the capacity and proximity to monitor
corporations does not mean that they should or would take up the
expression of other stakes that stakeholders have. The investment role of
institutions defines their objectives in monitoring. If we pass other interests
and stakes onto institutions and expect such institutions to be able to
internally mediate that which we have passed on, can we realistically expect
them to arrive at a proportionate and balanced “stewardship” stance with
ease? And are we, by “passing the buck” to institutions, actually avoiding
the more difficult task of ideologically reconciling private interests, such as

149. See UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, supra note 5, princ. 1, 6.
150. Amit Goyal & Sunil Wahal, The Selection and Termination of Investment Management
Firms by Plan Sponsors, 63 J. FIN. 1805, 1813 (2008); Breaking the Short-Term Cycle, supra note
48, at 1–2; see ASPEN INST., supra note 62, at 2.
151. Wong, supra note 63, 406.
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business and investment, with the more social and communitarian
expectations of corporate citizenship?
E. FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE AGENCY PARADIGM
A number of commentators have argued that the conventional agency
paradigm that defines shareholders as residual claimants and principals, and
management as agents, is too simplistic when applied to the banking and
finance sector.152 Ciancanelli et al. argue that the agency paradigm is much
more complex in the banking sector.153 As banks are highly leveraged—
depending on deposits and wholesale funding to form a large part of their
working capital—depositors and creditors share a substantial amount of
residual risk. Further, the potential of state bailout, as mentioned above,
puts the state into the position of a key stakeholder mitigating shareholder
and creditor risk. Hence, the agency paradigm in the banking sector is not a
simple binary shareholder-management model, but should comprise of key
stakeholders such as the state, depositors, and wholesale and repo market
creditors.
The Stewardship Code, by putting shareholders into the central
monitoring role, may be endorsing the simple agency paradigm in corporate
governance, which may arguably be retrograde in considering corporate
governance reform in the banking sector. It may be argued that by shackling
stewardship to a shareholder-centered premise, an opportunity has been
missed to distinguish corporate governance in banks from other industries.
If we distinguish corporate governance in banks from other industries to
begin with, this may open the way for new dialogic movements to take
place in respect of the corporate governance of banks and financial
institutions, and a broader range of stakeholders could be enrolled into the
governance landscape monitoring banking trends and impact.
It could be argued that the Stewardship Code mistakenly concentrates
monitoring in the hands of shareholders, where other stakeholders may have
greater incentive to monitor, thereby unnecessarily relegating the
importance of other stakeholders. Yet, depositor apathy is well
documented,154 and the state is able to monitor through micro- and macroprudential regulatory supervision. So, can it be said that because other
stakeholders do not amount to much anyway, re-emphasizing shareholders’
role is the appropriate step to take in corporate governance? This Article is
152. Alexander, supra note 7, at 991–92, 1006–07; Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate
Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 323 (2011).
153. Penny Ciancanelli & Jose Antonio Reyes Gonzalez, Corporate Governance in Banking: A
Conceptual Framework 6–7 (Paper Submitted for Presentation at the European Financial
Management Conference, Athens, June, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf
?abstract_id=253714.
154. See, e.g., Mülbert, supra note 121, § 4.2.3.2.
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inclined toward the view that the emphasis placed on shareholders in the
Stewardship Code reflects a reluctance to take a more progressive position
in corporate governance. This is a curious stance given that policy-makers
view corporate governance as an important driver in the general governance
landscape for the financial sector. As the crisis provides an apt opportunity
for reform, it is curious why there is such reluctance to introduce bolder
shifts in the corporate governance paradigm in the banking sector. Bruner
also argues that the re-emphasis placed on shareholders in the Stewardship
Code is path-dependent rather than imaginative.155
F. OVER-ESTIMATING THE GOVERNANCE POTENTIAL OF
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
Further, it may be argued that the governance potential of institutional
shareholders may be over-estimated in “stewardship.” It can be said that
sufficiently important issues would not likely be left to shareholder
governance anyway. In other words, if an issue becomes an important one
of social concern, reliance would not be placed on institutions as stewards
to mediate the various stakes it is asked to represent, or to decide on a
course of engagement to change corporate behavior. The state would
directly regulate or intervene. Stewardship is not, therefore, intended to be a
channel for strong policy or regulatory representation. Rather, this is the
case of bankers’ remuneration regulation.
Executive remuneration, and now bankers’ remuneration, has often
been subject to academic discussion as to what extent remuneration
arrangements are actually efficient and reflect optimal market prices, given
supply and demand conditions and the worth of the executive’s
performance.156 Nevertheless, regulators have not hitherto taken intrusive
approaches even if market failure is suspected. In the U.K., much reliance is
placed on independent remuneration committees to make the decisions for
155. Bruner, supra note 102, at 329–32.
156. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (detailing how boards and
executives negotiate at less than arms length in respect to executive compensation, thereby
diminishing shareholder gains and executive incentive to perform) (for a critical review of
Bebchuk and Fried’s book, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review Essay: Executive
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615 (2005)); Linda J. Barris, The
Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59
(1992) (discussing the harmful effects of excessive executive compensation and the theories for
controlling such compensation, and arguing that the most effective means of control will be
through institutional investors supported by active shareholder participation and by the court
system); Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299 (2009) (arguing that executive compensation reform
is largely driven by lawmaker motivations); Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation
and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining excessive
executive compensation and its consequences, and arguing that such compensation must
ultimately be kept in check by judicial remedies).
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their respective companies and on shareholders’ scrutiny of the disclosure
made. Post-global financial crisis, features of bank/financial institution
remuneration that give massive bonuses and take a short-termist view of
performance are argued to have contributed to weak risk management157 in
financial firms. Where the same flaw appears in many financial institutions,
systemic risk effects will result.158 The connection between remuneration
policies and risk management is now recognized and legalized in the EU
Directive of November 2010 amending the Capital Requirements Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC.159 The Financial Services Authority (FSA)
has enacted the Remuneration Code in the FSA Handbook SYSC 19A in
order to transpose the Directive. The overriding principle in remuneration
control is that remuneration should be aligned with sound risk management;
hence, risk management input is mandatory in the design of remuneration
packages.160 The regulatory intervention into remuneration at financial
institutions is not imposed due to market failure, but is rather framed around
the rhetoric of systemic risk and public interest. As external considerations
of systemic risk and social cost cannot, by their nature, be satisfactorily
undertaken at the level of private/internal governance by remuneration
committees,161 the way is paved for regulatory intervention to provide
governance. Hence, policy-makers would not likely address issues of
157. Commission Green Paper on the Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and
Remuneration Policies, ¶ 3.1, COM (2010) 284 final (June 2, 2011), available at http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0284:FIN:EN:PDF.
158. See M. BRUNNERMEIER, A. CROCKETT, C. GOODHART, A.D. PERSAUD, HYUN SHIN, THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 3–5 (11 Geneva Reports on the World
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regulatory concern through a relatively indirect and weak mechanism such
as shareholder stewardship.
Shareholder stewardship is a reflexive expression of the indirect stakes
of “key stakeholders”; however, such “stakes” do not amount to that which
may warrant immediate regulatory attention and control. Even if the state is
a “key stakeholder” in a particular sector, it is likely that “key
stakeholders,” such as the state, would only bring pressure to bear on
institutions in challenging times rather than in good times. In good times,
stewardship could likely become cosmetic, as many would be indifferent as
to how and why institutions engage their investee corporations, and the
state may not wish to preemptively influence shareholder governance where
there are no fires to fight. More demands on institutions to express social
stakes may only be made in more difficult times. But if an issue attains
enough social importance, regulatory control may, nevertheless, be
imposed. Therefore, the likely trajectory of the institution’s governance role
could be an ebbing of governance in good times and total irrelevance in
times of crises when regulatory control takes over. This could leave the
governance role of stewardship practically meaningless. Hence, shareholder
stewardship could ultimately become a lightweight and a mere rhetoric, not
actually expressing the indirect stakes and social concerns as a consistent
force for governance.
Despite the abovementioned weaknesses, this Article sees potential in
the ideologically transforming possibilities in stewardship: as a crank in a
window through which stakeholder interests and communitarian values
could be let in. It remains to be seen whether regulators would actively
influence the governance role of institutions and whether stakeholders
would actively seize opportunities to influence the discourse and trajectory
in corporate governance. This Article hopes that by framing stewardship in
terms of a form of indirect representation of “key stakeholders’” stakes, the
evolutionary potential in transforming corporate governance can be seized.
It is now appropriate to seek a balanced reconciliation between the private
contractarian and capital-centered view of the corporation, and its actual
social and public significance.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the Stewardship Code, introduced in response
to the global financial crisis 2008–2009, may be regarded as having
introduced an ideological shift in corporate governance theory in the U.K.
Although the Stewardship Code affirms the key governance role of
shareholders, institutional shareholders are especially asked to behave as
“stewards,” and thus, to focus on long-termism and take into account the
wider public interest and social good. This Article also argues that while the
Stewardship Code cannot be regarded as supporting the shareholdercentered contractarian model of corporate governance, which is dominant in
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both theory and law in the U.K., as the implications of the private nature of
shareholder-centered corporate governance are not fully supported by the
Stewardship Code, this does not mean that the Stewardship Code embraces
communitarian theories of corporate governance as an archetypal opposite.
This Article further argues that the Stewardship Code, read together with
the Walker Review—which provides a contextual backdrop to the
Stewardship Code—has affirmed the “governance” capacity of institutional
shareholders as a form of “market-based” governance that is capable of
monitoring systemically significant financial institutions. Such monitoring
is not only undertaken to further institutions’ private investment interests,
but also to represent the interests of stakeholders, such as the state, who
may incur the liability of financial bailout. For this reason, stewardship is
an expression of representing “key stakeholder” interests, such as the
state’s, which mitigate shareholders’ own residual risk in firms. This Article
therefore argues that the representative capacity of stewardship, governed
by normative standards for engagement in the Stewardship Code—such as
long-termism and consideration for wider good—has the potential to
introduce changes to the dominant shareholder-centered corporate
governance theory and frameworks.
This Article suggests that stewardship brings about an evolutionary step
toward mitigating the central role of shareholders in corporate governance,
and although it does not go as far as to endorse stakeholder theory, the
expression of stakeholder interests through stewardship can still be
powerful depending on how stewardship is called to account. There are,
however, ideological and practical challenges to transforming the dominant
shareholder-centered contractarian framework in corporate governance
theory. This Article, having hopefully provided a balanced evaluation,
remains optimistic about the evolutionary possibilities of stewardship as a
first step toward ideological change and development.

